United Nations A/ES-10/674–S/2015/139

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
26 February 2015

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 25 February 2015 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General-Assembly and the President of the Security Council

The situation of the Palestinian civilian population under Israeli occupation remains critical owing to innumerable policies and practices being perpetrated by Israel, the occupying Power, in systematic, gross violation of international law, including, inter alia, the laws specifically intended to protect civilians in situations of armed conflict, including foreign occupation.

The right to life of Palestinian civilians — children, women and men — is under constant threat due to the excessive, indiscriminate force routinely used by the Israeli occupying forces and acts of violence and terror committed by Israeli settlers. Such brutality at the hands of the occupation, along with other measures of intimidation and provocation, continue to wilfully cause death and bodily harm and injury to Palestinian civilians, including permanent disabilities for thousands of people.

Today, we remember the appalling massacre committed by an Israeli settler against Palestinian worshippers in Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Al-Khalil on 25 February 1994 during the holy month of Ramadan. This heinous massacre was strongly condemned by the Security Council and led to the adoption of resolution 904 (1994) which called for "... measures to be taken to guarantee the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians throughout the occupied territory, including inter alia, a temporary international or foreign presence, ...".

Twenty-one years later the Palestinian people continue to suffer. Yesterday, 24 February 2015, a young Palestinian lost his life to the senseless brutality of the Israeli occupying forces. Nineteen year-old Jihad Shehadeh Al-Jaafari was shot and killed during a pre-dawn military raid by the occupying forces in the Dheisheh refugee camp in Bethlehem. Reports indicate that he was shot directly by Israeli sniper fire while on the rooftop of his home. Such violent Israeli raids are carried out on a daily basis in the West Bank, including in and around Occupied East

Please recycle

Jerusalem, with hundreds of raids per month causing dozens of Palestinian casualties, resulting in particular from the use of live ammunition against our defenceless civilian population in their homes, in peaceful demonstrations and in the streets of their neighbourhoods and communities.

Palestinian civilians also remain under constant threat of arrest, detention and abuse of their persons while in captivity; seizure and destruction of their property, including their homes, resulting in their forced dispossession and displacement; and obstruction and destruction of their livelihoods; as well as virulent racist attacks by extremists and institutionalized discrimination by the occupation.

I wish to highlight just a few examples of the many recent attacks, particularly by Israeli settlers, who continue to be emboldened by the occupying Power's illegal and rabid settlement colonization campaign throughout Occupied Palestine. This includes the recent wounding of two Palestinians, a 10-year-old girl, Mariam Kareem Dana, in the Silwan neighbourhood of Occupied East Jerusalem, and a 21-year-old man, Hassan Abdelrahman Badran, in Al-Khalil area, in settler attacks. Both were targeted by settlers using vehicles as a weapon to run over civilians, a repeated crime for which there is no accountability, even in incidents causing death, as in the killing of a 5-year-old Palestinian girl, Inas Khalil, in October 2014, by a settler. Also, on 21 February, Israeli settlers attacked and stabbed a 10-year-old Palestinian boy while he was playing in the snow in the Tel Rumeida area of Al-Khalil. Israeli settlers also continue to carry out near daily attacks against Palestinian farmers and shepherds and to uproot and burn olive trees and entire groves, undermining the livelihoods and sustenance of hundreds of Palestinian families.

Also, today, extremist Israeli settlers again set fire to a mosque, this time Al-Huda Mosque in the Palestinian village of Jaba'a south of Bethlehem. The fire, set in the early dawn hours, caused extensive damage to the mosque, in addition to settler vandalism of its walls with graffiti calling for the killing of Arabs and Muslims. These hateful, violent actions continue to be committed by Israeli settlers with impunity and threaten to ignite a dangerous religious confrontation. We thus again draw the international community's attention to the escalation of religious tensions due to such Israeli provocations and incitement against Palestinian Muslim and Christian communities and holy sites, including Al-Aqsa Mosque in Occupied East Jerusalem, which also continues to be subjected to provocations and incursions by Israeli extremists, and the potentially grave and manifold consequences of such reckless aggravation of this already volatile situation.

At the same time, the entire Palestinian civilian population under Israel's occupation suffers from continuous and multiple human rights violations resulting from the measures of collective punishment imposed by the occupying Power, most oppressively and inhumanely in the form of the illegal blockade of the Gaza Strip, which has caused the isolation and deprivation of the entire population, severely impacting their well-being. The disastrous humanitarian situation and consequent precarious security situation in the Gaza Strip have been well documented by the United Nations agencies on the ground, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and has been repeatedly brought to the attention of the Security Council by the United Nations Special Coordinator, Mr. Robert Serry, in his briefings, yet to no avail.

Regrettably, there has been little relief for the Palestinian people as the illegal Israeli blockade of Gaza continues and reconstruction of the thousands of homes and other civilian infrastructure destroyed in the criminal Israeli aggression of July-August 2014 continues to be obstructed. The massive destruction caused by the occupying forces has left more than 100,000 people without adequate housing and shelter, grossly violating this human right. This has resulted, inter alia, in the exposure of civilians to extreme weather conditions, including flooding and freezing cold, which have caused death and illness, especially affecting children, causing further distress and despair for an already traumatized people. Moreover, electricity cuts of up to 18 hours a day and lack of access to an adequate water supply, both exacerbated as a result of the combined impact of the blockade and the Israeli aggression, continue to negatively affect all aspects of daily life and to intensify the frustrations and distress of the population.

The cumulative result of these ongoing illegal Israeli policies and actions is the deepening of the protection crisis being endured by the Palestinian civilian population. While international humanitarian law, specifically as codified in the Fourth Geneva Convention, stipulates the responsibility of the occupying Power for the protection of the civilian population under its occupation, Israel is instead launching daily assaults on the Palestinian civilian population. Rather than ensuring the safety and well-being of the civilian population under its occupation, Israel is violating this and many other obligations defined in the core human rights covenants with impunity and with grave impact on the Palestinian people.

We thus reiterate our appeals for the protection of the Palestinian people in accordance with the relevant provisions of international law and we recall the appeals made in this regard in specific by President Mahmoud Abbas. The pledges and commitments made by the international community, inter alia, in the context of the Security Council's efforts to address the protection of civilian persons in armed conflict as well as the declarations by the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention to honour their obligation to respect and ensure respect of the Convention in all circumstances, must be upheld, including vis-à-vis the situation in the Occupied State of Palestine. Measures must be undertaken, in accordance with international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, and the relevant United Nations resolutions, to compel Israel to cease its violations and to respect its legal obligations. This is imperative for alleviating the suffering of the Palestinian people under this nearly half-century Israeli military occupation, as well as for diffusing the volatile situation on the ground and for salvaging the prospects for peace, which have been so severely battered by Israel's criminal behaviour and intransigence.

In this regard, before concluding, I must again also draw attention to the extremely negative impact of Israel's illegal withholding of Palestinian tax revenues on the Palestinian people and their Government. This illegal measure, undertaken deliberately and punitively in retribution for legitimate, peaceful and non-violent efforts by the Palestinian leadership to protect and advance the rights of the Palestinian people, continues to seriously harm the functioning of the Palestinian national institutions and services, including in the fields of health, education, law and order, and is having a detrimental impact on the well-being of our people. We therefore reiterate our call on the international community, to demand and to act to compel Israel, the occupying Power, to immediately release Palestinian funds and to cease all punitive measures and illegal actions against the Palestinian people and to

comply forthwith with all of its obligations under international law and to show in word and deed that it is committed to the path of peace that we have been long committed to.

The present letter is in follow-up to our 537 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the State of Palestine. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 12 February 2015 (A/ES-10/673-S/2015/109), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed against the Palestinian people. Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine
to the United Nations

United Nations A/69/796–S/2015/140

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
26 February 2015

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda items 33, 38, 64, 66, 68, 82 and 83

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Promotion and protection of the rights of children

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Promotion and protection of human rights

The rule of law at the national and international levels

The scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction

Security Council
Seventieth year

Letter dated 25 February 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

As you are aware, the most serious international crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, have been committed in the course of the ongoing aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Twenty-three years ago, an unprecedented massacre was committed against the Azerbaijani population in the town of Khojaly in the Nagorno Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

On the night of 25 to 26 February 1992, the Armenian armed forces invaded and ruined the town of Khojaly.

As a result of this act of genocide, 613 peaceful residents were murdered and 1,275 were taken hostage. The fate of 150 of them is still unknown. More than 1,000 people were disabled by bullet wounds; 83 children, 106 women and 70 elderly people were among the killed; and 78 of the mutilated were minors, boys and girls. Six families were murdered to the last man, 25 children lost both parents and 130 children lost one parent; 56 men were burned alive.

The level of brutality in Khojaly is shocking, and atrocities included scalping, beheading, bayoneting of pregnant women and the mutilation of bodies. The facts confirm that the intentional slaughter of the civilians in Khojaly was directed at their mass extermination only because they were Azerbaijanis. By committing this appalling

Please recycle

crime, its perpetrators also had a purpose, to strike terror into the hearts of people and create fear before the horrifying massacre. Indeed, Khojaly was chosen as a stage for further aggression against and occupation and ethnic cleansing of Azerbaijani territories.

Apart from the considerable information in the possession of the law enforcement agencies of Azerbaijan, the responsibility of Armenia, as well as its political and military leadership and subordinate local armed groups for the crimes committed in Khojaly has been reported, recognized and documented by numerous international mass media organizations, human rights organizations, independent sources and eyewitnesses to the tragedy.

But above all, the Republic of Armenia's responsibility for the crime in Khojaly has been admitted by Armenia itself, by its high-ranking officials and the country's public sources.

The following from the interview of President of Armenia, Mr. Sargsyan, to the British journalist Thomas de Waal leave no doubt as to the question of the perpetrator of the crime in Khojaly:

> "Before Khojali, the Azerbaijanis thought that they were joking with us, they thought that the Armenians were people who could not raise their hand against the civilian population. We were able to break that [stereotype]".[1]

According to the Armenian author Markar Melkonian, who dedicated his book to his brother, the well-known international terrorist Monte Melkonian, who personally took part in the assault on Khojaly, the town "had been a strategic goal, but it had also been an act of revenge".[2]

Melkonian particularly mentions the role of the fighters of the two Armenian military detachments, "Arabo" and "Aramo", and describes in detail how they butchered the peaceful inhabitants of Khojaly. Thus, as he puts it, some inhabitants of the town had almost made it to safety, after fleeing for nearly six miles, when "[Armenian] soldiers had chased them down". The soldiers, in his words, "unsheathed the knives they had carried on their hips for so long, and began stabbing".[3]

No comments.

The date of 26 February was proclaimed as Day of Khojaly Genocide and National Mourning by the Milli Majlis (Parliament) of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The people of Azerbaijan will never forget the Khojaly tragedy and will continue the legitimate pursuit of justice until it prevails.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 33, 38, 64, 66, 68, 82 and 83, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

---

[1] Thomas de Waal, *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* (New York and London, 2004), p. 172.

[2] Markar Melkonian, *My Brother's Road: An American's Fateful Journey to Armenia* (London and New York, 2005), p. 214.

[3] Ibid., pp. 213 and 214.

United Nations S/2015/141

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 February 2015

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 26 of Security Council resolution 2173 (2014), in which the Council requested me to report every 90 days on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The report provides an update and analysis of the situation in Darfur and progress towards the achievement of the Operation's strategic priorities and benchmarks from the time of my previous report, dated 26 November 2014 (S/2014/852), until 12 February 2015.

2. Under paragraph 7 of resolution 2173 (2014), the Security Council requested that I conduct, in close cooperation with the African Union, and seeking perspectives from all relevant parties, an analysis of the implementation of the review of UNAMID, including specific achievements under the revised strategic priorities, progress in addressing the challenges facing the mission, as identified by the review, any significant developments in the situation in Darfur and their impact on the mandate and tasks of the Operation and an analysis of those tasks that remain relevant, and in the fulfilment of which the United Nations country team has a comparative advantage, with a road map to transfer those tasks to the fullest extent possible to the United Nations country team, taking into account contributions of donors and other relevant actors. I am submitting a special report to the Council containing my assessment in this regard and further recommendations for the future mandate, composition, configuration and exit strategy for UNAMID, as well as for its relationship with other United Nations actors in Darfur and in the Sudan.

II. Overview and analysis of the conflict dynamics, and operating environment in Darfur

A. Analysis of the current trends and conflict dynamics in Darfur

3. The security situation in Darfur, which deteriorated during the period under review, was defined by three main trends. First, since December, little progress has been made in the direct negotiations between the Government of the Sudan and the armed groups. Preparations for the national dialogue have also stalled and tensions have increased in anticipation of the upcoming national elections. Second, increased

15-02340 (E) 040315

Please recycle

political tensions have coincided with a marked escalation in the conflict in Darfur between the Government and the armed movements with the redeployment of the Rapid Support Forces in December. Third, the civilian population continued to be affected by intercommunal conflict resulting from the economic situation and conflicts over land and resources. The population is also affected by widespread criminality owing to the severe disruption of traditional livelihoods and weakened dispute-resolution and rule-of-law mechanisms.

Negotiations and other political developments

4. Direct talks between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) and the Justice and Equality Movement-Gibril Ibrahim (JEM/Gibril), two of the Darfur armed movements that are not signatories to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, commenced under the auspices of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in Addis Ababa on 23 November. Despite concerted efforts, the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW), also a non-signatory to the Doha Document, decided not to take part in this round of negotiations. During the talks, the Government reiterated its position that it would not reopen the Doha Document for negotiations, while the armed movements insisted that they were not bound by an agreement they had never signed. On 26 November 2015, the Implementation Panel proposed to the parties that security arrangements, political issues, humanitarian issues, relations between the negotiations and the national dialogue and method of work would be included as agenda items for the talks. The Government rejected the proposal to include humanitarian issues as a separate agenda item in the talks, which they argued could be discussed within the context of security arrangements or political issues. The armed movements, however, insisted on retaining humanitarian issues on the agenda and also proposed the addition of items on reconstruction and development; refugees and internally displaced persons; land, borders and nomad issues; justice, accountability and reconciliation; and comprehensive compensation. Unable to agree, the Implementation Panel adjourned the talks on 30 November to provide the parties with an opportunity to consult with their constituencies on options to break the impasse.

5. Following this adjournment, on 3 December, in Addis Ababa, the political and armed opposition in the Sudan, including the Darfur armed movements, adopted a joint declaration entitled the "Sudan Call" pledging to end the wars and to create a comprehensive solution, beginning with a cessation of hostilities, to the conflicts in Darfur and in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States and to establish mechanisms and committees aimed at achieving a popular uprising or a comprehensive political solution leading to the dismantling of the one-party-regime in Khartoum. The declaration further outlined the basic prerequisites for the holding of the national dialogue, a comprehensive political solution, including a cessation of hostilities, the release of all political detainees, the revocation of laws restricting freedoms and human rights, the formation of a transitional government and the establishment of an agreed administration to manage a dialogue process for a comprehensive peace and democratic transformation. The signatories also pledged to boycott the presidential and legislative election scheduled to take place in April 2015, calling it a facade to legitimize the current regime. The stalemate in both the Darfur and Two Areas mediation tracks and the adoption of the "Sudan Call" have contributed to a significant rise in political tensions in the Sudan.

6. Following these events, and upon their return to Khartoum from Addis Ababa, on 6 December, the Government arrested the head of the opposition National Consensus Forces, Farouk Abu Issa, and the civil society activist, Amin Maki Mali Madani. The Government also confiscated copies of several editions of the newspapers *Akhir Lahza* and *Al-Midan* and filed a request with the registrar of political parties for the dissolution of Sudan's largest opposition party, the National Umma Party, on 14 January. On 20 January, 18 of the 21 political parties registered in the Sudan announced the suspension of their participation in the national dialogue based on the Government's insistence on proceeding with elections. The opposition political parties argued that the timing of elections should be an outcome of the national dialogue, as agreed in the road map for the national dialogue.

7. On 4 January, the Sudanese National Assembly, without the opposition parties, adopted a series of constitutional amendments, including the appointment by the President of the State Governors, who were hitherto elected, and the expansion of the authority of the National Intelligence and Security Service to include direct control over the Rapid Support Forces, which have been deployed to suppress the rebellions in Darfur and the Two Areas. Simultaneously, at the end of January, the Sudanese Parliament passed a freedom-of-information law to increase the right to access public information.

8. In Darfur, tensions grew between the leader of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and Chairperson of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA), El Tigani Seisi, and the Secretary-General of LJM, Idriss Bahar Abu Garda, about corruption, unilateral decision-making, tribal preference and lack of a unified political ideology. Seisi was accused of intentionally delaying the transition of LJM into a political party in order to remain in his current position for two more years. In late December differences between the two men were reported over the implementation of the security arrangements for the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. As a result, the principal LJM alliance of six disparate factions, five former SLA factions and the United Revolutionary Forces Front began to unravel along ethnic lines, with the Fur, along with the Massalit and ethnic "Arab" clans supporting Seisi and the Zaghawa, Tunjur and other ethnic "Arab" clans supporting Abu Garda. On 16 January, Seisi dismissed Abu Garda from LJM. However, two days later, the Chairperson of the LJM Revolutionary Liberation Council issued a statement that Seisi had been removed as Chairperson of the movement. Both Abu Garda and Seisi have registered two separate political parties under the name of the Liberation and Justice Party. Both political parties have until 1 March 2015 to finalize the party's establishment and security arrangements or they will be excluded from the election process.

Fighting between Government forces and rebel groups

9. Following a similar pattern to the events in Darfur one year ago, the beginning of the dry season coincided with the launching of offensive military action by the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements. The reporting period witnessed a marked increase in fighting between Government forces and the SLA/MM in North Darfur and SLA/AW in Jebel Marra. On 23 December, while addressing a graduation ceremony of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) Command and Staff College, President El-Bashir announced the resumption of "Operation Decisive Summer", with the aim of eliminating those armed movements in Darfur and the Two Areas that did not heed the Government's call for dialogue. The announcement

was followed by intensified fighting between Government forces and SLA/AW in East Jebel Marra and with SLA/MM near Tawilla, North Darfur.

10. Two weeks before the announcement, on 9 December, SAF commenced a four-day siege of SLA/AW positions near Rofata, Central Darfur. On 10 December, SLA/AW responded by attacking a SAF troop rotation convoy in Ragabe Jamal, Central Darfur. On 11 December, SLA/AW elements also attacked a SAF convoy escorting the Commissioners of East and Central Darfur in Guldo, Central Darfur, in which five people were killed and two SAF personnel injured. On 23 December, the Government of the Sudan deployed Rapid Support Forces to Nertiti, Central Darfur, and launched an attack on SLA/AW elements in the area of Rokero. The strategically important settlement of Fanga Suk, West Darfur, which connects the state capitals of Central and North Darfur and which was long held by SLA/AW, fell to a joint SAF/Rapid Support Forces operation on 1 January following heavy fighting. On 8 January, the Minister of Defence and the Director-General of the National Intelligence and Security Service visited Fanga Suk and praised their troops for the liberation of the area after 13 years. On 18 January, SAF and Rapid Support Forces launched another large-scale operation against SLA/AW in the Golo area. On 24 and 25 January, fighting between SAF, Rapid Support Forces and SLA/AW was reported in the Azra and Sarrong areas, to the north-east of Nertiti.

11. Despite bearing the brunt of the campaign led by the Rapid Support Forces in early 2014, in November 2014, SLA/MM announced plans to retake its former strongholds along the northern and southern sides of the central corridor: the Thabit/Abu Zerega/Shangil Tobaya triangle in North Darfur as well as Khor Abeche, Shearia, Labado and Muhajeria in South and East Darfur. On 31 December, violent clashes between Government forces and SLA/MM erupted in the vicinity of Tawilla, North Darfur, affecting the civilian population in 27 villages, including Tarabat, Massala, Tombora, Sambile, Hajura, Dorma, Khaze, Timoa, Kurukutu, Tian, Duga and Dababise. On 20 January, SLA/MM announced that 31 of its fighters, including its operations commander, had been killed in an ambush by Government forces at Orchi in the Um Baru locality, North Darfur, on 13 January. UNAMID was unable to assess the impact of the defeat at Orchi on SLA/MM's military plans or overall structure as it could not gain access to the conflict area.

12. During the reporting period, no direct confrontations were reported between the Government of the Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement/Gibril (JEM/Gibril). The Government of the Sudan continued to urge the Government of South Sudan to cease support for Sudanese rebel movements, particularly JEM/Gibril. During a visit to Nyala, South Darfur, on 12 December, the Director-General of the National Intelligence and Security Service stated that any aggression from the territory of South Sudan on the Sudan would be considered a hostile act and would warrant a pursuit of JEM/Gibril into that country, as highlighted in my report on the situation in South Sudan dated 17 February 2015 (S/2015/118, para. 23).

Aerial bombardments

13. On 16 and 18 November, UNAMID received reports of aerial bombardment taking place in Abu Leha, Kornoi and Rofata in North Darfur in support of the Government's ground offensive against SLA/MM. With the participation of the United Nations Mine Action Service, UNAMID verified the presence of two bomb

craters in the area. No injuries were reported in these incidents. The mission also received reports of aerial bombardment in the vicinity of Jurajeen near Um Baru, North Darfur, on 16 November, and subsequently confirmed the presence of one crater in the area. Aerial bombardment reportedly resumed in the Um Baru locality on 7 January and continued until 13 January when SAF ground forces captured Orchi from SLA/MM. On 9 January, the Government of the Sudan denied a UNAMID verification patrol access to Um Baru because of ongoing military operations in the area.

14. UNAMID confirmed aerial bombardment near Rofata, Kaya, Jawra, Kanuary Fattah Kirma and Sullow villages in North Darfur on 11 December. On 13 December, additional bombardments took place in Sullow village, with two confirmed deaths on the ground. UNAMID received further reports of aerial bombardment in the Sabanga area of Central Darfur on 14 December, resulting in the death of eight SLA/AW fighters. On 27 January, UNAMID received reports of aerial bombardment in Arra, Kirro, Koron, Bar Arie, Tala and Noni villages north of Golo in North Darfur. UNAMID was unable to gain access to these locations owing to the ongoing conflict between Government forces and SLA/AW.

Threats and attacks against civilians

15. A total of 61 cases of violence and attacks against civilians, resulting in the loss of 113 lives, were recorded by UNAMID during the reporting period. A total of 23 incidents occurred in North Darfur, with 60 fatalities; 16 incidents in South and East Darfur, with 31 fatalities; and 22 incidents fatalities in West and Central Darfur, with 22 fatalities. Arab militias were alleged to have perpetrated 18, the forces of the Government of the Sudan 15 and unknown perpetrators 28 of the recorded attacks.

16. Internally displaced persons were the victims of continuing attacks during the reporting period. They expressed their concerns to the mission regarding the deteriorating security situation, the presence of armed men, random shooting, harassment and the destruction of farms, particularly in the Ardamata camp near El Geneina in West Darfur and the Kalma and Al Salaam Camps in South Darfur. UNAMID and humanitarian actors received frequent reports from internally displaced persons and others affected by the deliberate destruction of crops by Government forces and militias as part of the latest increase in violence. The worst-affected areas were Tawilla, El Fasher and Um Baru localities.

17. In North Darfur, on 2 January, a group of approximately 100 armed men on camels and horses attacked internally displaced persons in Biery village near Kutum, North Darfur, killing seven people. On 17 January, following a dispute over land ownership, an undetermined number of armed militia in about 10 land cruisers and 3 armoured personnel carriers attacked farmers in the Susuwa area near Zamzam Camp in North Darfur, killing one civilian and abducting three others. On 28 January, elements of the Rapid Support Forces attacked the village of Musbat near Um Baru, killing three civilians. On 30 January, Rapid Support Forces attacked the villages of Hashaba, Um Sidir, Basheen and Mellit in North Darfur. One civilian death was confirmed in the incident.

18. On 23 November, four unidentified men abducted four female internally displaced persons in the vicinity of Labado, South Darfur, raped two of them and physically assaulted and severely injured the two others. Upon their release, on the

same day, the victims received medical treatment at the UNAMID team site in Labado. On 4 December, two female internally displaced persons were physically attacked and one raped by two unidentified armed men in the Um Kudus area near the internally displaced persons' camp in Kalma in South Darfur. On 5 December, two unidentified armed men fired on a group of internally displaced persons from the Al Salam camp in the outskirts of Nyala, South Darfur. One internally displaced person was killed in the incident.

Local violence and intercommunal conflicts

19. Intercommunal clashes over access to land, water, pastures and other resources continued during the reporting period, although the level of intensity decreased. A total of eight confrontations, with 40 fatalities, were recorded as compared to 11 confrontations and 377 confirmed deaths during the previous period. With the beginning of the dry season, the risk of clashes between Arab nomads migrating southward and sedentary communities harvesting their crops increased.

20. Disputes over cattle grazing or land use, in some cases involving internally displaced persons, occurred in East and West Darfur. On 20 November, Abbala tribesmen clashed with members of the Zaghawa internally displaced persons' community in Tabaldia, near Labado, East Darfur. The incident, which was reportedly triggered by a cattle-grazing incident, resulted in the death of one Abbala tribesman. Later the same day, a group of armed Abbala tribesmen aboard gun-mounted vehicles set fire to a number of houses in Tabaldia and nearby Chawa villages, reportedly resulting in the death of two members of the Zaghawa community and the looting of cattle. In a separate incident involving Abbala and Zaghawa internally displaced persons, a renewal of tensions resulted in attacks by elements of both tribes on 19, 22 and 23 November in parts of Labado over delays in blood money (*diya*) payments. In West Darfur, on 3 December, Abbala nomads attacked Massalit farmers in the vicinity of Azerni village near El Geneina as a result of a dispute over land use, resulting in the death of four farmers and burning of 14 houses.

21. Another incident involving clashes between tribesmen and internally displaced persons occurred in Central Darfur on 3 December when approximately 50 armed Bargo tribesmen (mainly from the Misseriya tribe) blocked all the routes leading into the Hamidiya internally displaced persons' camp. The incident related to an attempted robbery against a Bargo tribesman on 2 December, allegedly perpetrated by internally displaced persons from the Hamidiya camp (predominantly of the Fur ethnicity). The Bargo tribesmen mobilized and attacked the camp on the same night, killing two and injuring four internally displaced persons. The incident raised tensions in the camp significantly.

22. In West Darfur, crop destruction and cattle grazing on cultivated land resulted in an attack on 2 December on the Karya returnee village near Masteri by a group of approximately 60 armed Arabs. The incident resulted in the killing of one villager, looting of property and partial burning of the village. A similar pattern of attacks was reported in Kadadol returnee village on 3 and 5 December, when armed Arabs, mainly from the Awlad Ziad and Najaa subtribes, attacked Deliba following disputes between farmers and nomads.

23. Tensions remained high with respect to the conflict between the Ma'alia and the Southern Rizeigat in East Darfur. While no major incident occurred during the

period under review, the reported theft of 320 sheep belonging to the Southern Rizeigat by the Ma'alia in Birghit on 13 January nearly triggered another round of fighting. The incident resulted in the death of one member of the Southern Rizeigat community and injury to seven others. With support from the Government of the Sudan, leaders from both tribes intervened to stem tensions and facilitated an agreement to avoid retaliatory attacks.

Criminality and banditry

24. Criminality remained a significant security concern for the population in Darfur. A total of 208 crimes were recorded by UNAMID during the reporting period in comparison to 284 cases during the previous period. The most common crimes included robberies and theft (56 incidents), armed attacks (40 incidents), murder (35 incidents), assault (18 incidents), carjackings (17 incidents), sexual and gender-based violence crimes (14 incidents), abductions (11 incidents), cattle-rustling (10 incidents), arson (3 incidents) and destruction of property (4 incidents). A total of 68 incidents were recorded in North Darfur, 48 in West Darfur, 38 in South Darfur, 27 in East Darfur and 27 in Central Darfur. Most of the suspected perpetrators, which included members of militias and armed elements, were not arrested or brought to justice due to the absence of Government security authorities in some villages. The slow and inefficient justice system also continued to contribute to a culture of impunity in Darfur.

25. On 3 February, unknown armed men aboard eight land cruisers attacked the market in Mellit, North Darfur, and killed 10 civilians and injured 13 others in an alleged robbery incident. On 13 January, in Abu Karinka, about 200 armed Ma'alia men aboard three vehicles attacked Rizeigat herders in Beg hit village, injuring seven of them and stealing approximately 1,000 goats. On 5 February, unknown armed men in a land cruiser shot at Zaghawa herders and robbed them of approximately 600 goats in Disa village, North Darfur. Several of the alleged incidents occurred within the peripheries of internally displaced persons' camps, targeting those communities. This included a number of sexual and gender-based violence crimes perpetrated by armed men against internally displaced women and children. On 15 January, for example, an unidentified man on a camel reportedly raped a 12-year-old schoolgirl in Tina village, North Darfur.

B. Humanitarian situation

26. The increase in hostilities between the forces of the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements in several regions of Darfur resulted in the further deterioration of the humanitarian situation and the further displacement of tens of thousands of civilians. Humanitarian partners confirmed that close to 39,000 people have been displaced since December 2014. Reports of significant additional displacement in Rokero locality, North Jebel Marra, could not be verified due to long-standing access restrictions imposed by Government authorities.

27. The majority of the verified new internally displaced persons have moved into established camps in close proximity to El Fasher, allowing for basic humanitarian assistance to be provided from existing contingency stocks. Response to new needs has, however, been more challenging in Tawilla and Nertiti and for the approximately 4,500 internally displaced persons sheltering in the safe haven

established by UNAMID directly adjacent to its team site at Um Baru, a remote location with a small pre-existing humanitarian presence. Nonetheless, by early February, basic assistance was being provided in all areas understood to be hosting newly internally displaced persons, apart from the largely inaccessible Rokero locality. By 4 February, humanitarian partners had arranged four United Nations Humanitarian Air Service flights to Um Baru, providing nutrition, water and sanitation supplies and basic household items. Additional critically required food and nutrition supplies are expected to arrive in the area shortly, at which point the majority of the key needs of the high number of displaced persons residing at Um Baru are expected to be largely covered.

28. The latest wave of displacement is part of a broader deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Darfur. More than 450,000 people were newly displaced in 2014 — the highest level of displacement in a single year since 2004. Of this number, at least 300,000 people have remained in displacement, pushing the overall estimated number of internally displaced persons in Darfur above 2.5 million. The volume of new arrivals in camps and other locations has greatly increased assistance and protection needs, further stretching an already severely underresourced aid operation. Just 55 per cent of funding requirements set out in the 2014 Sudan strategic response plan were covered by the end of the year ($545 million of $995 million).

C. Operating environment

29. The operating environment in Darfur continued to present significant challenges for the implementation of the mission's mandate and for programme delivery by humanitarian actors. The main challenges included attacks and threats against personnel, the carjacking and theft of vehicles and movement restrictions imposed by the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements.

30. UNAMID continued to experience attacks from armed groups, particularly in the areas between Khor Abeche and Menawashei in South Darfur and Labado in East Darfur. Four attacks on UNAMID personnel occurred during the reporting period. On 12 December, a group of about 20 unidentified armed men attacked a UNAMID patrol in Wadi Korno near Khor Abeche, South Darfur, resulting in injuries to three peacekeepers and the theft of two vehicles, one weapon and other equipment. On 19 December, a group of unidentified men attacked a UNAMID patrol in Um Zeifa near Labado, East Darfur. Although the patrol members successfully repelled the attack, two sustained gunshot wounds. On 6 January, 11 unidentified armed men attacked a UNAMID military patrol in Burumburum near Khor Abeche. Two of the attackers were killed in an exchange of fire with the patrol, while three were reported to have died subsequently as a result of their injuries. On the same day, 15 unidentified armed men attacked a UNAMID patrol while it was collecting water at a borehole in Habilla. The attackers disarmed the soldiers and seized two UNAMID vehicles, as well as weapons and other property. The two vehicles were subsequently recovered with the assistance of SAF and returned to UNAMID. UNAMID has conducted an investigation into the incident. Appropriate actions will be taken with a view to ensuring that patrols are not vulnerable to such attacks in the future.

31. On 29 January, seven unidentified armed men stopped a UNAMID bus in the vicinity of the Zalingei supercamp and abducted two international contractual workers, who remain in captivity.

32. UNAMID continued to face restrictions of movement by the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements. During this period, UNAMID land movements were restricted on 63 occasions, compared with 72 restrictions during the previous reporting period. The Government imposed a total of 59 restrictions, while SLA/AW imposed three and LJM one. Restrictions were highest in North Darfur, including the Thabit area, as well as South and East Darfur. The most common reasons given for the restrictions were alleged security concerns in the particular area. During the reporting period, the Government of the Sudan refused clearance for 28 out of 3,665 planned UNAMID flights.

33. The vast majority of humanitarian access requests during the period under review were cleared by the Government of the Sudan. Since mid-November 2014, the Government approved 139 out of 150 requests. This is similar to the approval rate during the previous reporting period. However, of the 139 humanitarian missions for which access was granted, 12 were later cancelled, postponed or only partially completed due to restrictions imposed at the local level. In addition, in several cases where access was approved, restrictions were imposed on the participation of staff or personnel from certain sectors. Regarding the latter, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as lead agency of the protection sector, continues to face significant challenges in securing permits for its international staff to travel from Khartoum to several states in Darfur. Furthermore, the locations to which access was denied have been largely cut off from international assistance for several years, including parts of Jebel Marra, localities in Central Darfur and Sharq Jebel Marra in South Darfur.

34. On 21 December, armed elements of the SLA/AW surrounded the UNAMID team site in Sortony, North Darfur, and demanded the handover of two contracted vehicles that they claimed to belong to companies affiliated with the Government of the Sudan. Following negotiations, UNAMID representatives declined to comply with the armed element's demands and they withdrew from the area, warning UNAMID not to move outside its team site. UNAMID troops took a defensive posture and after further negotiations with the SLA/AW leadership, UNAMID patrols in Sortony resumed on 24 December.

35. A total of 46 criminal acts targeting United Nations and UNAMID personnel occurred during the reporting period compared to 31 during the last reporting period. Carjacking and the theft of United Nations and UNAMID vehicles remained particularly common in El Fasher, North Darfur, and Nyala, South Darfur, due to the continued presence of armed elements and criminal gangs in the area. A total of 14 successful and five attempted carjackings of UNAMID and United Nations vehicles occurred during this period, with two vehicles recovered with the assistance of the Government. In addition, two car thefts and 25 incidents of robbery and break-ins were reported at United Nations and UNAMID premises. All cases were placed under investigation by UNAMID and the Government of the Sudan. In one of the cases involving the alleged theft of a UNAMID vehicle from the Zalingei supercamp, eight of the mission's national staff suspected of the crime were arrested by the Sudanese police between 21 January and 9 February. The UNAMID Legal Unit visited the detained staff members on 11 February and found them healthy and

well treated. All eight were released on bond by 14 February. In order to minimize the risks of increased criminality, UNAMID restricted the movement of personnel in El Fasher and Nyala. While addressing the security of personnel, these measures significantly constrained outreach and programmatic aspects of the mission's work.

36. During the reporting period, the Government of the Sudan issued 523 visas for UNAMID personnel, including 12 civilians, 141 military, 236 police, 131 contractors and three consultants. As at 26 January, 21 visa requests were pending for five civilian personnel, seven military and nine contractors.

III. Achievements and impact of the mission

A. Peace process

Direct negotiations with the armed movements

37. In collaboration with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, UNAMID continued to engage the Government of the Sudan, the Darfur armed movements and other relevant stakeholders on how to ensure the success of the direct talks between the parties and thereby achieve a cessation of hostilities as a basis for a credible and inclusive national dialogue. To enhance the capacity of the armed movements to engage in direct talks with the Government of the Sudan, UNAMID organized a workshop on: negotiation skills, ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities in Addis Ababa from 17 to 20 November, with the participation of 30 field commanders and representatives of the JEM/Gibril and SLA/MM armed movements.

38. The direct talks between the Government of the Sudan and JEM/Gibril and SLA/MM, led by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, were held in Addis Ababa from 23 to 30 November. The mediation was supported by UNAMID, my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

39. From 20 to 24 January, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, the Acting Joint Special Representative/Joint Chief Mediator (JSR/JCM) and my Special Envoy resumed diplomatic shuttling to Doha, Ndjamena, Khartoum, and Addis Ababa to brief regional leaders on the mediation work and to seek support and consensus on the way forward in discussions on the cessation of hostilities. They also met with representatives of the Darfur armed movements in Addis Ababa on 29 January.

Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

40. The sixth session of the Darfur Council of the Darfur Regional Authority, which was held in El Fasher from 8 to 23 December, highlighted the recent progress made in the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. During the reporting period, the Justice and Equality Movement-Sudan (JEM-Sudan) and the Government of the Sudan continued to implement the power-sharing provisions of the agreement. On 3 December, President Bashir appointed Sadiq Yousef Zakaria and Mohammed Ahmad Hario, both of JEM-Sudan, as Minister of Agriculture and Minister of Social Care, respectively, of the Darfur Regional Authority. Bahar Abdelgadir was also appointed as Chairperson of the Darfur Nomad and Herder

Development Council and Nahar Osman Nahar as Chairperson of the Darfur Social Welfare Fund. Ten additional members of the movement were appointed to the Darfur Council, with one given the post of Deputy Speaker.

41. From 2 to 20 November, in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Development Programme, the Ceasefire Commission and other partners, UNAMID provided technical and logistics support to the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission for the demobilization of ex-combatants from JEM-Sudan and affiliated movements at the demobilization site in Turbo, North Darfur. A total of 534 ex-combatants were demobilized, including 287 from JEM-Sudan, 215 from the Sudan Liberation Army-Mustafa Terab (SLA/Mustafa Terab), 28 from the Sudan Liberation Army-Mother (SLA/Mother) and 4 from the Justice and Equality Movement-Peace (JEM/Peace). On 22 December, as part of the final security arrangements on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission of the Darfur Regional Authority launched the integration of combatants from LJM in South and East Darfur into SAF and the Sudanese police forces. According to the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission, some 4,664 LJM combatants voluntarily participated in the integration process. On 6 February, the integration of LJM into SAF began in West Darfur.

42. On 29 January, UNAMID was informed by JEM-Sudan that, to date, since acceding to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, only 13 out of 21 of its prisoners had been released. However, no progress was made on the release of the remaining 35 prisoners. A further 17 members of JEM-Sudan abducted by JEM-Gibril remain in captivity in reportedly very difficult conditions.

43. As part of the first phase of a three-phased programme under the Darfur Regional Development Fund, the Government of the Sudan and the Darfur Regional Authority continued to finance strategic infrastructure projects, including the reconstruction of roads between Nyala, El Fasher and Kutum, and the Abu Jabra railway, as well as 315 other projects currently being implemented. In addition, Darfur has been connected to the national power grid and the construction at the airports in Zalingei and El Daein has been completed.

44. The ninth meeting of the Implementation Follow-up Commission of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur was convened in Nyala, South Darfur, on 12 January, with Ahmed bin Abdullah Al Mahmoud, Deputy Prime Minister of Qatar, as Chairperson, and including the participation of the signatories to the agreement, the Government of the Sudan, LJM and JEM-Sudan and UNAMID, along with representatives of other relevant stakeholders. While noting delays in the implementation of the Doha Document, particularly with respect to the final security arrangements, the participants reiterated their full commitment to it.

45. Following the provision by the Government of Qatar of seed-funding for the Darfur internal dialogue and consultation process at the end of December, the process was launched in El Fasher on 25 January, in Nyala on 27 January, in El Geneina on 1 February, in Zalingei on 4 February and in El Daein on 8 February. The process commenced with strong messages of support for dialogue, reconciliation and compromise from federal and State government officials, as well as members of civil society and community leaders. Depending on funding availability, the process will involve community-based dialogues in the 64 localities of Darfur, as well as in Khartoum, and among refugee and diaspora communities.

The process aims to consolidate peace, promote confidence-building and encourage reconciliation, as outlined in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

B. Protection of civilians

Provision of physical protection

46. The mission continued to maintain a visible security presence in support of humanitarian activities and in building confidence among civilians to engage in socioeconomic activities. Protection activities continued to be conducted for displaced populations in camps and in the vicinity of team sites, villages, towns, markets and areas of return.

47. During the reporting period, UNAMID military personnel conducted 15,748 patrols, including 8,720 routine patrols, 2,980 night patrols, 2,353 logistical and administrative escorts, 1,068 short-range patrols and 356 long-range patrols as well as 271 humanitarian escorts. UNAMID police continued conducting patrols with the support of formed police units and military components. Police patrols placed greater emphasis on interaction with communities and assessments of the security situation in internally displaced persons' camps. In addition, a total of 8,145 police patrols, including 4,144 confidence-building patrols to internally displaced persons' camps, 3,454 patrols in villages, towns and markets, 178 firewood, grass or farming patrols and 15 commercial route patrols were conducted. Of these patrols, 926 were medium range, 354 were long range and 6,865 were short range.

48. Following a rise in tensions in August 2014, as a result of a plan by the local authorities to conduct a cordon and search operation within the Kalma internally displaced persons' camp in South Darfur, during the period under review UNAMID enhanced physical protection measures for the internally displaced population through the establishment of a temporary operating base in the area. In addition, UNAMID continued to engage with the Government of the Sudan to uphold human rights and humanitarian law while implementing security measures, which also served to reduce tensions in the area.

49. On 12 December, fire engulfed the Labado internally displaced persons' camp, resulting in the destruction of approximately 400 dwellings and the camp's market. The quick response of UNAMID to extinguish the fire saved lives. Injured camp residents were treated at the mission's Labado team site level one clinic.

50. Following clashes on 2 January in Tawilla, North Darfur, UNAMID provided initial support to newly displaced people, including the provision of water, food rations and basic health care in the Argo internally displaced persons' camp. Humanitarian partners, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and international non-governmental organizations provided shelter, food items and medical care.

51. On 14 January, internally displaced persons set-up camp around the Um Baru team site, North Darfur, in search of safety and protection due to ongoing conflict in the area. The numbers steadily grew over the subsequent weeks, and by early February, approximately 4,500 people were estimated to be accommodated at the site. UNAMID and humanitarian partners estimate that a further 20,000 persons in

the surrounding areas are in need of protection. UNAMID is working closely with humanitarian actors in Um Baru to provide tents, water storage tanks, food, water and medical services. UNAMID established a "gender desk" at the site to help address the concerns of displaced women.

52. Also in North Darfur, on 20 January, approximately 150 civilians, mostly women and children, sought refuge in an area close to the UNAMID Sortony team site. The civilians expressed their fear of an imminent attack on their villages by the forces of the Government of the Sudan. UNAMID provided the displaced persons with tents and water and liaised with humanitarian partners in order to ensure the provision of more durable assistance. On 21 January, the majority of displaced persons were able to return to their villages.

53. UNAMID continued to address the threat posed by explosive hazards through the clearance of suspected areas and ammunition safety management operations. A total of 165 items of unexploded ordnance were recovered from 11 villages. Of the more than three million pieces of expired small arms ammunition at the Zamzam team site, 478,500 items were safely destroyed. More than 62,000 civilians were directly provided with small arms safety and explosive ordnance risk education, while radio plays conveyed safety messages to an (estimated) additional 200,000 civilians. The refurbishment of weapons and ammunition storage facilities in El Fasher continued, with further assistance planned for the other states. In addition, on 22 December, UNAMID defused two 60 mm mortar bombs near Angara and "old" Labado, South Darfur, and conducted a complete sanitization of the area, clearing it of unexploded ordnance.

Logistical and security support to humanitarian operations

54. In the light of the fragile security environment in North and Central Darfur, UNAMID worked closely with humanitarian agencies to access remote locations, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, provide escorts and logistical support, carry out integrated joint missions and contribute to area security. UNAMID provided 173 humanitarian escorts throughout Darfur and, together with the United Nations country team, facilitated one medical evacuation for critically injured internally displaced persons from the Hamidiya camp to Khartoum.

55. UNAMID also airlifted 1,381 kgs of essential medicine for the World Health Organization (WHO) to Labado, Muhajeria and El Daein, East Darfur. On 19 January, UNAMID provided containers to UNHCR for non-food items for eventual distribution to the Kalma internally displaced persons' camp, including 500 plastic sheeting materials, 1,000 blankets, 500 jerry cans and 500 kitchen sets. The joint UNAMID-WFP logistics operation facilitated the transfer of 4,645 kgs of food to areas in dire need throughout Darfur. Following the recent carjacking of loaded WFP trucks conveying food, the mission provided escorts for 17 WFP convoys and a total of 180 trucks.

Protective environment

56. During the reporting period, UNAMID documented 83 new incidents, involving 191 victims (10 minors), of human rights violations and abuses compared to 210 incidents involving 406 victims during the last reporting period. The mission verified 45 cases of human rights violations and abuses, while the remaining 38 cases, though unconfirmed, were highly likely to have occurred based on

corroborated information from various sources. Of the 83 cases, 29 cases, involving 52 victims, were allegedly perpetrated by the Government of the Sudan and affiliated entities (police, Rapid Support Forces, Popular Defence Force, Border Guards and SAF). In the remaining 54 cases, victims described the perpetrators as unidentified armed men or armed Arab men. Thirteen cases, involving 34 victims (2 minors), were of violations of the right to life; 13 cases, involving 34 victims (2 minors), were violations of the right to physical integrity, including 3 cases and 10 victims of abduction, while sexual and gender-based violence accounted for 12 cases involving 26 victims (6 minors). One incident of attempted rape involving one victim was recorded.

57. During the reporting period, national law enforcement authorities did not follow up on the majority of human rights violations brought to them, thus undermining the protection environment in Darfur. Out of the 83 recorded incidents, victims reported 46 to Government of the Sudan authorities. Investigations were initiated in only 13 of the reported cases, resulting in 10 arrests. Out of the 10 arrests, four persons are currently awaiting trial. One suspect was released for lack of evidence. Another suspect was released following a mediated settlement with the victim. UNAMID has not been able to obtain information from the Government on the two remaining cases. In the remaining 33 incidents, UNAMID was informed by witnesses and/or victims that no action was taken by Government authorities to investigate the cases. The reasons given for the absence of any investigation include the non-existence of police stations, particularly in Kutum, Tawilla, Korma and Saraf Omra, North Darfur, the lack of knowledge of the perpetrators' identity and lack of police and judicial capacity. Victims and their families also cited a lack of willingness by law enforcement agencies to investigate in other cases. As part of its work to engage the Government in improving the criminal justice capacity in Darfur, UNAMID is supporting a two-month programme in Khartoum to train 50 lawyers from Darfur as prosecutors.

58. The implementation of 25 community-based labour-intensive projects for at-risk youth, initiated in 2013-2014, has been completed. A total of 15 new projects, which were approved for the 2014-2015 budget year, will provide vocational training to 1,200 youth and improved access to health, education, livelihoods, water and sanitation for 40,000 community members.

59. Two paralegal centres in the Abu Shouk internally displaced persons' camp in North Darfur and the Kalma internally displaced persons' camp in South Darfur were rehabilitated in order to provide suitable venues for community-related activities, such as the provision of legal advice and referral (pathway) guidance for camp residents. As part of the UNAMID strategy to stem intercommunal conflict, on 15 December, a road map to enhance the capacity and the skills of 80 rural court judges in mediating land and resource-related conflicts was approved at a meeting between the mission and the Sudanese Judiciary in Khartoum.

60. On 16 December 2014, the mission received the non-official English translation of a summary of the report of the Attorney General appointed for a special court on the allegations of mass rape in Thabit village, North Darfur. It concluded no victims, witnesses, documents or other evidence were found in Thabit village to support a case for rape. UNAMID continues to face restrictions in its effort to access Thabit village for further investigation.

C. Local conflict mediation

61. The reporting period saw a number of examples of interventions by the authorities and traditional community mediators, with the mission's facilitation, to prevent or resolve violent intercommunal conflict. Two of the most significant interventions related to the conflict between the Ma'alia and the Southern Rizeigat in East Darfur and the resolution of the situation between the Hamidiya internally displaced persons' camp and the Bargo in Central Darfur.

62. UNAMID continued to engage with government authorities at the federal and state levels, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of the Darfur Regional Authority in North and East Darfur, as well as in Khartoum, to energize the reconciliation process between the Southern Rizeigat and the Ma'alia. On 29 and 30 November, the mission facilitated two preparatory workshops for the Ma'alia in Abu Karinka and the Southern Rizeigat in El Daein. These workshops were aimed at facilitating dialogue, adopting unified positions and defusing lasting tensions between the two tribes after the failure of the Al Fula reconciliation conference in June 2014.

63. On 22 December, representatives of UNAMID, the Darfur Regional Authority and the Kasha Centre for Peace and Security organized a peace forum, which was attended by prominent personalities from Darfur, officials of the Darfur Regional Authority, officials of the Government of the Sudan and representatives of the Ma'alia and Southern Rizeigat. The communities reaffirmed their commitment to the cessation of hostilities agreement reached in Al Taweisha, North Darfur, in August 2013, and agreed to participate in a Government-proposed reconciliation conference scheduled for early 2015.

64. Progress was made in Central Darfur in resolving a dispute between residents of the Hamidiya internally displaced persons' camp and the Bargo. On 19 December, UNAMID and the Peaceful Coexistence Committee organized and facilitated a mediation meeting between internally displaced persons and representatives of the Bargo to resolve the conflict. UNAMID immediately increased patrols in the camp and surrounding areas and held a series of separate meetings with the native administrations of both groups, the local Fur leader and the Chairperson of the Peaceful Coexistence Committee on 3, 10, 15 and 16 December 2014 and 19 and 23 January 2015 to encourage peaceful resolution of the conflict. Although the Committee recommended compensation for the injured internally displaced persons as a goodwill gesture to peacefully resolve the conflict, the parties have yet to agree upon this proposal.

65. In another mediation effort, on 18 and 19 November, UNAMID conducted a field mission to Tawilla to engage with community members, internally displaced persons and their leaders on the release of three Zaghawa hostages abducted on 11 November by Arab nomads from Umjalbakh near Kutum, North Darfur. On 27 December, in the Rehade El Berdi locality, South Darfur, the mission, together with the Minister of Industry and a mediation committee, facilitated a breakthrough in negotiations between the Ta'aisha and Salamat that enabled the latter group to return to its place of origin.

66. On 26 November, in cooperation with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, UNAMID launched a Darfur-wide campaign entitled "No Child

Soldiers — Protect Darfur" in Miseriya, North Darfur. The Miseriya location was chosen following a surge in inter- and intra-tribal clashes in North Darfur in which children were used as fighters. Sheikh Musa Hilal, a prominent tribal leader in North Darfur, and other community figures welcomed the initiative. On 17 December, Hilal issued an order prohibiting communities under his leadership from using children in ethnic clashes. This was followed by the initiation of a community-based strategic plan against violations, endorsed by individual leaders from a number of tribes, including the Northern Rizeigat/Abbala, Beni Hussein, Fur, Tama, Gimir and Awlad in various areas of North Darfur. The campaign was subsequently launched in El Fasher on 9 December, with plans to spread it to other parts of Darfur.

67. The mission maintained engagement with local stakeholders to encourage peaceful coexistence between farming and pastoral communities during the agricultural season and strengthened joint committees to promote intercommunal dialogue on practical ways to share access to natural resources and avoid clashes. To that end, 19 meetings were held in all states of Darfur and eight deep-field missions were conducted to meet with community leaders in hotspot areas in all the states. Discussions focused on the progress of the agricultural season and the promotion of peaceful coexistence between farmers and nomads. As a follow-up, UNAMID and a local non-governmental organization conducted a meeting to promote peaceful coexistence between farmers and nomads in Fata Borno, North Darfur, on 23 November, which focused on improving inter-tribal relations and protecting farmers during the agricultural season.

68. In December 2014, as part of its efforts to provide continued support to reduce conflicts between farmers and pastoralists emanating from limited water resources, UNAMID commenced the implementation of the Darfur Capacity and Peacebuilding project, funded by the Government of Japan and implemented by the Nomadic Development Council. The project includes the excavation and rehabilitation of 100 natural water sources, nine of which have been completed. The project will increase access to and availability of water for pastoral communities and potentially reduce conflict between farmers and nomads resulting from a lack thereof.

IV. Financial aspects

69. The General Assembly, by its resolution 69/261, appropriated the amount of $1,153,611,300 for the maintenance of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015.

70. As at 10 February 2015, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAMID Special Account amounted to $353.3 million, and the total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to $2,735.2 million. As at the same date, reimbursement to contributing Governments for troop and formed police costs and for contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the period up to 31 August 2014 and 30 September 2014, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

V. Observations and recommendations

71. The launching by the Government of "Operation Decisive Summer" against non-signatory rebel movements and offensive operations by those movements has had a decidedly negative effect on the security situation, particularly in North and Central Darfur. The homes, villages and livelihoods of innocent civilians have been destroyed.

72. I call on the Government and non-signatory movements to engage in negotiations for the cessation of hostilities, without preconditions, and to address their political differences peacefully at the negotiation table. They must stop the violence for the sake of the innocent civilians affected.

73. While there have been some positive developments in community-level reconciliation processes in North, East and South Darfur, I am concerned that ongoing military operations are undermining social cohesion and that, with weapons so readily available, communities will continue to resort to violence to ensure access to natural resources.

74. I call on the Government, in particular, to exercise its sovereign responsibilities in ensuring the protection of the citizens of the Sudan. UNAMID and the United Nations country team stand ready to provide assistance in building the capacity of the Government and local communities to fight impunity, ensure accountability for attacks and human rights abuses and to assist the Government and local communities to address the root causes of violence.

75. The stalemate in the peace talks between the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements is regrettable. It is essential that all parties dedicate themselves to achieving a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The armed movements must focus on achieving gains on substantive issues rather than seeking a new platform or peace process. I call on the parties to exercise flexibility and goodwill in resuming negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive and sustainable peace.

76. Civilians in Darfur continue to suffer human rights violations, including through the destruction of homes and property, displacements and sexual and gender-based violence. The range of violations illustrates both the volatility of the situation in Darfur and the persistence and prominence of perpetrators within the forces of the Government and the armed movements.

77. I am deeply concerned about the continued threats and attacks on UNAMID and on humanitarian and contracted personnel. In particular, I condemn the four armed attacks on the mission's peacekeepers during the reporting period, the numerous carjacking incidents in El Fasher and Nyala and the kidnapping of two of the mission's contracted personnel, who remain in captivity. I call upon the Government of the Sudan to swiftly investigate and bring those responsible for these actions to justice.

78. UNAMID continues to encounter restrictions of movement, mostly in North and South Darfur, in most cases imposed by Government security agencies, but also by the armed movements. I would like to reiterate my appeal to the Government and the armed movements to allow unrestricted access to UNAMID and humanitarian partners to enable them to effectively implement their mandated tasks. In this regard, I deeply regret that UNAMID has not been able to regain access to Thabit to

continue to investigate persistent allegations that a mass rape occurred in the village.

79. I commend the parties to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur for the progress made in implementing the provisions of the agreement, despite significant delays. I encourage the parties to take further concerted and concrete steps to provide the people of Darfur with the peace dividends they expected when the Doha Document was signed in 2011. I welcome the support of the Government of Qatar for the conduct of the Darfur internal dialogue and consultation process, which provides a good opportunity for engagement in a dialogue process that can address the root causes of conflict. The process must therefore be embraced by all Darfuris. I call upon other donors and the international community more generally to fulfil their pledges and to contribute financially towards the successful implementation of the process.

80. In conclusion, I would like to thank the Acting Joint Special Representative/Joint Chief Mediator, Abiodun Bashua, and all the women and men of UNAMID, the United Nations and the non-governmental organizations, who, in the face of considerable adversity, continue their relentless efforts to improve the lives of the people of Darfur. I also commend my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan, Haile Menkerios, and Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Abdulsalami Abubakar of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel for their efforts to resolve the Darfur conflict.

Map No. 4327 Rev. 16 UNITED NATIONS
February 2015 (Colour)

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2015/142

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 February 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 24 February 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the policy paper prepared for the symposium entitled "Enhancing women's share in peace and security", held in Vienna on 3 and 4 November 2014 (see annex).

I would be grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Martin **Sajdik**
Permanent Representative

15-03048 (E) 030315

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 24 February 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Enhancing women's share in peace and security: good practices, gaps and challenges in the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda — emerging trends and priorities in twenty-first-century security (3-4 November 2014, Vienna)

Policy paper: women and peace and security agenda — progress and remaining challenges after 20 years of implementation

The year 2015 is important for the women and peace and security agenda. It also marks the twentieth anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the fifteenth anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), on women and peace and security. These documents recognized for the first time the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women and, in particular, the important role of women as active agents of change in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security.

Over the past two decades, essential progress has been made in implementing the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and resolution 1325 (2000) on various levels. Member States, the United Nations system, international, regional and subregional organizations and civil society groups have invested in the development of policies, action plans, guidelines, programmes and training with a view to ensuring women's active participation, the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in peacekeeping and the prevention and resolution of conflict.

In spite of these efforts, however, numerous challenges remain. Grave abuses and acts of violence against women, including sexual violence and rape, continue to be a common occurrence in conflict and post-conflict settings all around the world, and current cycles of violence in different parts of the world stand out for their disproportionate impact on women and girls. The call made in resolution 1325 (2000) for increased representation of women at all decision-making levels and the inclusion of women in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict has not become the norm, but remains marginal. In addition, media coverage of conflicts is still dominated by a stereotypical portrayal of women and men that creates an overall image of women as helpless victims of rape, sexual violence and displacement while neglecting to document and present the various ways that women act as combatants, supporters of conflict, mediators, peacebuilders, decision makers and agents of change.

Symposium entitled "Enhancing women's share in peace and security"

Against this background, and as a contribution to the campaign of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the global study on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), Austria hosted a symposium entitled "Enhancing women's share in peace and security" in Vienna on 3 and 4 November 2014. The symposium brought together international experts from politics, government, military, academia, the media and civil society to discuss major achievements, remaining challenges and emerging priorities in the

implementation of the women and peace and security agenda in the twenty-first century and provide recommendations for the way forward.

Following a high-level public opening, experts engaged in closed interactive discussions on progress, challenges and necessary future action focusing on the following four areas: (a) mainstreaming a gender perspective into conflict prevention and crisis management; (b) gender-sensitive conflict assessment and analysis; (c) women as active agents of change in peace talks; and (d) the role of the media in implementing resolution 1325 (2000). During the closing session, key findings and recommendations on how to achieve better results in the above-mentioned areas were presented. The recommendations aimed to ensure that women's potential to make crucial contributions to the resolution, management and prevention of conflict would become more visible, recognized and effectively used.

Recommendations for the way forward

Participants in the symposium stressed that the women and peace and security agenda represented a strategic and holistic approach to foreign and security policy that recognized that it was indispensable to involve both men and women, on an equal footing, in matters of peace and security in order to make conflict-resolution efforts more effective and increase the chances for achieving sustainable peace. Humanity as a whole, not only women, would benefit from women's increased involvement and participation.

Participants also called for a comprehensive understanding of the gender dimensions of armed conflict, as well as of peace processes, and for the integration of gender issues into all aspects of foreign and security policy. They stressed that gender inclusivity was fundamental to deconfliction and post-conflict State-building. They also highlighted the importance of differentiating between "gender" and "women" and of engaging more men and boys as champions of gender equality.

Participants acknowledged the lead that Africa had taken in the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and welcomed the appointment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of a Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security.

With a view to ensuring that women's needs and rights are recognized, their voices heard and their contributions to the establishment of long-lasting peace and security more effective, participants in the conference made the following recommendations:

Recommendations addressed to national Governments and international, regional and subregional organizations

- National Governments that have not yet done so should develop national action plans on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) by 2017 as a collaborative effort with civil society, including women's rights movements and organizations.
- National Governments should introduce and implement quotas for women's participation in relevant positions in foreign and security policy.
- National Governments should include, in national action plans on resolution 1325 (2000), strategies for working with and reaching out to the media and

contribute to raising the awareness of journalists so as to improve reporting on the resolution and its core topics of prevention, protection and participation, as well as on the overall women and peace and security agenda.

- National Governments should incorporate women and peace and security issues in their periodic reports to relevant human rights treaty bodies, in particular to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, in view of the Committee's general recommendation No. 30, and should implement the Committee's recommendations in this regard.

- National Governments should support the proposals of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals, in particular the proposed goals on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls and on peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice for all and effective and capable institutions, and should ensure coherence between the women and peace and security agenda and the post-2015 development framework.

- National Governments and international, regional and subregional organizations should prioritize the development of localization strategies for resolution 1325 (2000), to ensure that high-level political commitment is translated into meaningful implementation at the very local level.

- National Governments and international, regional and subregional organizations should work together with civil society to develop regional action plans on resolution 1325 (2000), in particular where it is necessary to address current conflict or post-conflict situations.

- National Governments and international, regional and subregional organizations should facilitate women's participation in peace talks, including by providing access to flexible funding mechanisms, in particular concerning logistical aspects such as access to visas and travel funds and by providing follow-up support to safeguard women's security.

- National Governments and international, regional and subregional organizations should boost women's capacities to participate in and contribute to formal and informal peace talks and dialogue processes by investing in developing the skills of women leaders, including women from marginalized populations, for example through the establishment of rapid, intensive training units.

- National Governments and international, regional and subregional organizations should promote gender-responsive budgeting frameworks and policies in the broader peace, security, governance and development strategies they support, to define priorities for maximizing the utility of existing resources and to ensure the integration of resolution 1325 (2000) into national and local planning processes.

- National Governments and international, regional and subregional organizations should promote participatory approaches to identify women and peace and security priorities, fund and implement those priorities and monitor progress at the local and national levels. Best practices in multi-stakeholder and partnership-based approaches to implementation, monitoring and

accountability activities related to resolution 1325 (2000) should be documented and scaling-up options outlined.

- National Governments and international, regional and subregional organizations should hold perpetrators of grave violations against women accountable, with no impunity whatsoever, and make clear that under no circumstances are the human rights of women negotiable.
- National Governments and international, regional and subregional organizations should develop a comprehensive understanding of the gender dimensions of armed conflicts and peace processes through context-specific gender and power analyses (social mapping) to be integrated into all conflict management, peacebuilding and programming efforts from the start-up phase.
- National Governments and international, regional and subregional organizations should use and report on gender-sensitive early warning indicators for conflict prevention developed by the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and civil society organizations, and should increasingly incorporate women in early warning and crisis management mechanisms supported by the latest information and communications technologies.
- National Governments and international, regional and subregional organizations should generate and earmark funding for activities aimed at improving the security situation of women in conflict zones.
- The United Nations should appoint a high-level personality as goodwill ambassador for women and peace and security issues.
- The United Nations should ensure that senior management throughout the United Nations system has been alerted to, is knowledgeable about and is aware of the importance of the effective implementation of resolution 1325 (2000).
- The United Nations should form a pool of experts composed of experts from civil society, Governments and the United Nations to offer assistance to States in the development of national action plans and should ensure that United Nations resident coordinators will provide the poorest countries with the support needed for their preparation, including technical assistance.
- The United Nations Development Programme should publish, in 2015, an update to the *Arab Human Development Report 2005* that focuses on women.
- The United Nations, international, regional and subregional organizations, including the European Union, should appoint more women as special representatives and envoys for conflict-affected countries.
- The United Nations, international, regional and subregional organizations should ensure that the terms of reference and mandates of all mediators and peacebuilding actors are gender sensitive and incorporate a gender perspective, thus ensuring that there is, from their part, accountability for the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda.
- The European Union and other regional and subregional organizations that have not yet done so should appoint a special envoy on women and peace and security, following the good practice of the African Union.

- International, regional and subregional organizations should coordinate and national Governments should participate in periodic formal peer reviews at the regional level to monitor Member States' progress and performance in the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000). This could be modelled on the peer review mechanism on development cooperation of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Recommendations addressed to civil society and the media

- Civil society should undertake a global review on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) complementing the global study on the implementation of that resolution requested by the Secretary-General.
- The media should raise the awareness of and alert journalists and media workers to gender issues in order to further gender-sensitive reporting.
- The media should avoid stereotyping the roles of women and men, provide coverage of the diverse roles played by women in conflict and in building, securing and maintaining peace and report in depth on the impact of gender issues, including women's and men's representation, on the success of conflict-resolution and peace talks.
- The media and civil society should increase efforts to monitor the media in order to ensure that women, as well as gender-related issues, including sexual atrocities against women and men, girls and boys, are adequately represented and addressed in the media.
- Civil society should intensify its advocacy at the national, regional and international levels for accountability and the effective implementation of resolution 1325 (2000).

Recommendations addressed to all actors

- All actors should identify, nominate and lobby for more female candidates to be appointed and selected for senior positions in the United Nations, in particular in the election of the next Secretary-General, in 2016.
- All actors should actively engage men and boys to support the women and peace and security agenda, including in the context of women and peace and security projects and programmes, and embrace the "He for she" campaign of UN-Women.
- All actors should engage religious leaders on the issue of the human rights of women and the women and peace and security agenda.
- All actors should identify resilience actors and peace activists in all stages of the conflict cycle and develop alternatives for non-violent conflict resolution.
- All actors should integrate the media in policies, campaigns and communications strategies on resolution 1325 (2000).
- All actors should customize information on resolution 1325 (2000) to local and regional contexts so that men and women can engage locally in successes and gaps in implementation.

- All actors should make the content of resolution 1325 (2000) available in local languages and use wording that non-experts can understand, and should conduct public outreach and educational activities, in particular through interactive programmes, by using modern communications technologies and forms of media, including film and social media, as well as by engaging the young.

- All actors should establish a dedicated multi-stakeholder financing mechanism to support the women and peace and security agenda and accelerate the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000).

United Nations A/69/799–S/2015/143

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
27 February 2015
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 51
Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 25 February 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

In the early hours of Wednesday, 25 February 2015, the Israeli occupation forces re-arrested the activist Sidqi al-Maqt, who had been released in August 2012 after being held in the bowels of the occupation's prisons for 27 years without legal or moral basis. Under cover of darkness, the occupation forces raided his family home in the village of Majdal Shams, in the occupied Syrian Golan. They ransacked the rooms of the house, vandalized furniture and confiscated the residents' mobile phones without giving any justification for their crimes, which are a flagrant violation of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic stresses that this crime was but one of a series of crimes committed by the Israeli forces against the Syrian civilians who live under Israeli occupation in the Syrian Golan. It is part of a long and shameful catalogue of human rights violations that stretch back across the more than 47 years in which the Syrian Golan has been occupied. The list includes intimidation, terrorism, forced displacement, demolition of Syrian towns and villages, plundering of natural resources and destruction of historic sites and the environment, among other disgraceful practices. Israel has persisted in flouting the authoritative international resolutions that require an end to the occupation. It has done so with impunity, having been granted freedom from accountability by certain members of the Security Council.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic once again calls on the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Security Council, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and all human rights organizations to insist that Israel immediately and unconditionally release the abducted captive Sidqi al-Maqt and free all citizens of the Syrian Arab Republic who are being held in the jails of the occupation. Syria calls on all parties to prevail on the occupation authorities in

the Syrian Golan to provide more humane sanitary conditions for Syrian citizens in the Golan and comply with the Fourth Geneva Convention and international humanitarian law. The Syrian Government rejects the show-trials to which the Syrian detainees have been subjected.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic insists that the Security Council must take the necessary legal measures to enforce its own resolutions, which require that Israel withdraw from all of the occupied Syrian Golan to the lines of 4 June 1967 and bring an end to its grisly practices and ongoing violations of the Charter of the United Nations, the resolutions of the Security Council and international humanitarian law.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2015/144

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 February 2015

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2144 (2014) of 14 March 2014. It covers major political and security developments, provides an overview of the humanitarian and human rights situation, and outlines the activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) since my report of 5 September 2014 (S/2014/653).

II. Political and security-related developments

2. As United Nations and international efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the political and institutional crisis in Libya accelerated during the reporting period, the overall security in the country continued to deteriorate sharply. Armed hostilities spread to the country's north-west, the eastern oil crescent area and the southern region. In the east, fighting intensified in Benghazi, causing the breakdown of much of the city's public services, resulting in severe shortages in the supply of food and medicine. The continued indiscriminate shelling and use of air assets against targets in heavily populated areas and strategic installations across the country underscores the growing plight of the civilian population and the systematic destruction of much of the country's vital infrastructure.

3. The closure of much of Libyan airspace to commercial flights, combined with an escalation in fighting across different parts of the country and diminished State capacity to provide basic services, aggravated the humanitarian crisis triggered over the summer months by the outbreak of violence in July 2014 and the gradual breakdown of law and order across the country. A video released by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) showing the mass beheading of 21 men in February, reportedly near Sirte, preceded by a spate of terrorist attacks targeting public buildings and foreign embassies, including those of Algeria, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, underscored the consolidation of power by extremist and terror-linked groups in the east and their increased visibility in other areas.

Institutional crisis and uncertainty

4. On 6 November 2014, the Constitutional Circuit of the Libyan Supreme Court declared the unconstitutionality of paragraph 11 of article 30 of the Constitutional

Please recycle

Declaration. The General National Congress had in March 2014 amended the paragraph in question as part of a set of legislative reforms aimed at addressing growing public concern regarding the tenure of the General National Congress. It was viewed as having paved the way for the June 2014 general elections for the House of Representatives.

5. Reactions by the main political actors to the Supreme Court's ruling appeared to strengthen anxieties regarding parallel legislative and executive bodies. The General National Congress, whose leadership had by then publicly reconvened the parliamentary body in direct challenge to the authority of the House of Representatives, viewed the Court's decision as an endorsement of its continued role in public life. For its part, the House of Representatives rejected the Court's ruling, arguing that it had been made under duress, while also noting that its own legitimacy was not in question given that it was derived from a credible and transparent electoral process which the Libyan High National Elections Commission had overseen and which the international community at large had recognized.

6. The Supreme Court's ruling and its aftermath continued to fuel much of the political crisis during the reporting period. That was clearly reflected in the attempts by both the House of Representatives and the General National Congress to assert control over State institutions and financial resources through legislation and by making key appointments to the Central Bank, the Libyan Investment Authority, the National Oil Corporation and the military.

Situation in the west

7. Following the Libya Dawn coalition's declaration of victory in Tripoli and its environs and the subsequent move by the General National Congress to reassert itself on the political scene, the coalition's leadership announced the appointment of a "government of national salvation". International reactions to the announcement remained largely muted, as Prime Minister Abdallah al-Thinni continued to be regarded as the legitimate Head of Government. In late September 2014, the House of Representatives reconfirmed Mr. Al-Thinni as caretaker Prime Minister, who by then had effectively relocated the seat of Government to the east in view of political and security developments in the capital.

8. Having established control over Tripoli, the Libya Dawn coalition commenced a major military operation in the Warshafana tribal belt area aimed at consolidating its control over the city's outskirts. Weeks of heavy shelling of the Azizya and Suwani areas between late August and early October triggered a severe humanitarian crisis, with at least 120,000 people estimated to have been displaced and acute shortages reported of food and medical supplies. The fighting also resulted in extensive damage to property and civilian infrastructure, including schools, hospitals and clinics.

9. A military counter-offensive by Zintani forces against Kikla and al-Qal'a areas in the Nafusa Mountains, ostensibly launched to thwart a possible advance by the Libya Dawn coalition on Zintan, left more than 170 people dead by the end of November, with hundreds injured and some 5,700 families displaced. Repeated calls by UNSMIL for all parties to cease fighting and allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid went largely unheeded.

10. The reporting period witnessed for the first time the use of air assets against Mitiga International Airport in Tripoli, targets in Misrata and the Ras Jdair border area with Tunisia.

11. Combat operations witnessed a major escalation on 13 December when Misratan armed groups attacked al-Sidra, the country's biggest oil load port. The move signalled the launch of Operation Sunrise, its primary objective being to wrest control of the oil crescent area from the Petroleum Facilities Guard. Both sides have since engaged in deadly clashes, focusing on the Ben Jawwad village area west of al-Sidra. The fighting in the oil crescent area resulted in the closure of al-Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil load ports and the destruction of 7 crude oil storage tanks out of a total of 19, considerably reducing the country's capacity to export crude oil.

12. Attacks on Libyan cultural and religious sites increased during the second half of 2014. The majority of the attacks occurred in Tripoli and its environs. In that regard, the United Nations has repeatedly called for all necessary measures to be put in place to ensure the protection of designated cultural sites, particularly during military operations.

The situation in the east

13. In eastern Libya, fighting intensified between Operation Dignity, whose ranks largely comprise elements of the Libyan army and other forces loyal to General Khalifa Haftar, and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, a coalition of Islamist revolutionary brigades, which includes Ansar al-Sharia. The latter had brought large swathes of Benghazi under its control by mid-September 2014, but proved unable to take over Benina Airport to the east of the city. On 15 October, General Haftar's forces launched a new offensive and asserted control over a number of eastern and central neighbourhoods of the city.

14. In the absence of clear front lines, the fighting in Benghazi relied heavily on snipers, mortar fire, skirmishes and ambushes. Civilians increasingly joined the fighting on both sides, sparking cycles of revenge between families. Despite their systematic resort to airstrikes, artillery fire and tanks, forces operating under the banner of Operation Dignity were unable to take full control of the city, in large part owing to stiff resistance by the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council. The latter had also made use of suicide attacks, including twin car bombs targeting Benina Airport on 2 October, which killed 24 people. In a separate incident, a car bomb detonated by unknown perpetrators opposite the Tibesti hotel in Benghazi on 10 October reportedly killed four people.

15. Efforts to negotiate a ceasefire in Benghazi have met with little success. On 19 November, my Special Representative for Libya announced that the different parties to the conflict in the city had agreed to a 12-hour unconditional truce to facilitate passage of humanitarian assistance. It was only partially implemented and both parties blamed each other for breaching the truce. Despite its announcement of a ceasefire on 18 January 2015, the Libyan National Army made it clear that the measure did not apply to operations targeting "terrorists" in Benghazi, where fighting continued unabated.

16. In Derna, the Shura Council of Islamic Youth pledged allegiance on 3 October 2014 to ISIL. On 4 and 5 October, it reportedly conducted military parades in the city in which it displayed the ISIL flag. It also declared support for the

establishment of an Islamic caliphate state. While not all Islamist brigades in Derna have publicly subscribed to that goal, the Shura Council of Islamic Youth has since taken steps to assert full control over the city, including through the establishment of sharia courts and religious police patrols.

17. Bombings, assassinations and other killings believed to be associated with Islamist extremists in the east increased during the reporting period. In November, Libyan army positions and governmental installations in Marj, al-Mekhili, Tobruk and al-Abraq Airport were bombed in separate attacks. On 11 November, three Libyan human rights activists and an Operation Dignity soldier were reported beheaded by suspected Islamists in Derna. On 30 December, a car bomb detonated in front of the Dar al-Salam hotel in Tobruk, where the House of Representatives was in session. There were no fatalities, although three parliamentarians were reportedly wounded in the attack.

18. Fighting between Libyan National Army units and Islamist militants in and around Derna also increased during the reporting period. On 4 January 2015, a Libyan National Army airstrike hit a Greek-owned, Liberian-flagged oil tanker, which was anchored off the coast, after its crew reportedly refused to heed orders for a stop and search operation. Two crewmen, a Greek and a Romanian, were killed. Greece condemned the attack and vowed to hold those responsible for the deaths accountable. For its part, the shipping company rejected Libyan military accusations that its movements had aroused suspicion, insisting that the ship was delivering fuel to industrial facilities in Derna and that the authorities had been kept informed. On 10 January, fighting west of Derna reportedly killed five Libyan National Army troops and four members of the recently formed Derna Shura Mujahideen Council.

19. The mass beheading of 21 people by ISIL, 20 of whom were Egyptian Coptic Christians, triggered a military response from Egypt. On 16 February, a day after ISIL released the video showing the brutal killings, Egyptian fighter jets launched a wave of airstrikes against targets associated with Islamist groups. The Egyptian military stated it had targeted ISIL camps, training sites and weapons storage areas. A number of civilians were reportedly killed in the attacks.

Southern Libya

20. The military conflict between the Libya Dawn coalition and Operation Dignity forces continued to have a spillover effect in southern Libya, particularly by fuelling tribal tensions between the Tabu and Tuareg communities. That culminated in the struggle by armed groups on both sides for control of a number of key oilfields in the southern region.

21. In Awbari, intermittent clashes took place between Tuar and Tabu armed groups following attempts by Tuareg militias to take control of a number of strategic facilities in the area, including the city's airport and the nearby Sharara oilfield. The fighting resulted in the displacement of some 24,500 people, most of whom were subsequently hosted by communities in Brak al-Shati, Ghat, Murzuq and Sabha. There has also been increasing evidence of growing mobilization by both Tabu and Tuareg armed groups in the area.

22. Incidents of random kidnapping, murder and robbery remained prevalent in Sabha, as tensions escalated between various tribal groups, namely Awlad Suleiman,

Qadhadhifa and Tabu. Attempts by the Libyan authorities to reconcile the communities proved unsuccessful.

23. An attack by a group of armed men on a military checkpoint in the Jufra area on 2 January 2015 left at least 17 guards dead. The Fazzan branch of ISIL was blamed for the attack, as well as for an assault on a military headquarters in the area the same day.

Humanitarian impact

24. The humanitarian situation in Libya deteriorated markedly during the reporting period. Approximately 400,000 people are estimated to be internally displaced, of whom 360,000 were displaced as a result of the fighting that began in July 2014. Many have been displaced more than once as they moved from one location to another to escape the widening scope of the conflict. In addition, Libya continues to host some 37,000 refugees and asylum seekers of different nationalities, many of whom are living in precarious conditions.

25. In western Libya, UNSMIL estimates that armed hostilities in the Warshafana tribal belt area left approximately 100 dead, 500 injured and 120,000 displaced. The siege by Zintani forces of the towns of Kikla and al-Qal'a in the Nafusa Mountains reportedly left more than 170 dead and displaced more than 5,700 families. In the south, some 140 were reportedly killed in intertribal clashes in Awbari.

26. In the east, more than half of Benghazi's population is estimated to have left to escape the fighting. An estimated 450 people were killed in fighting between October and December. Much of the city's basic infrastructure is believed to have sustained considerable damage. Access to medical care remains a major problem in many areas of the city. A number of hospitals were shelled during the fighting, including the Benghazi Medical Centre and the Jumhuriya Hospital. Armed groups also occupied a number of other medical facilities, among them the Hawari General Hospital. The failure by the warring parties to respect their obligations under international humanitarian law to protect civilians and allow and facilitate humanitarian access, including through the establishment of secure corridors for the delivery of urgent humanitarian assistance, has contributed directly to the aggravation of the humanitarian crisis.

27. The escalation in fighting has had a disproportionate impact on children across Libya. While some schools sustained serious damage as a result of shelling, others were reportedly used as bases by parties to the conflict during combat operations in the Warshafana tribal belt area and the Nafusa Mountains. A number of schools in Benghazi, Tobruk, Tripoli and elsewhere were converted into makeshift shelters for internally displaced persons. Explosive remnants of war remain a major hazard for children.

28. Deteriorating security conditions in Awbari, Benghazi, Ghat, a number of areas in the Nafusa Mountains and other areas of conflict rendered them largely inaccessible to the humanitarian community, including United Nations staff, consequently limiting options for a comprehensive needs assessment and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Efforts to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Libya are also seriously impeded by the lack of structural capacity on the part of national authorities to provide assistance or financial contributions, as well as by recent moves by neighbouring countries to close or restrict border crossings.

Good offices of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

29. Throughout the reporting period, my Special Representative remained actively engaged in efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the country's political and institutional crisis, and to bring an end to the armed conflict. While those efforts were initially focused on addressing political disagreements within the House of Representatives regarding procedural issues and the handover of power from the General National Congress, the Supreme Court's ruling of 6 November 2014 necessitated an adjustment of the Mission's good offices approach so as to take into account growing concern regarding the possibility of parallel legislative and executive bodies becoming entrenched in the Libyan political landscape.

30. In a symbolic breakthrough, on 29 September, parliamentarians from both sides of the divide within the House of Representatives, including a number of members who had boycotted parliamentary sessions in Tobruk, attended direct face-to-face talks in Ghadames. The meeting, which was presided over by my Special Representative, concluded with a public commitment to convene a second round of talks to address all outstanding differences between the two parliamentary camps. Both sides committed themselves to seek a solution within the framework of a political process and called for an immediate nationwide ceasefire.

31. By way of confidence-building measures, participants in the Ghadames talks agreed to work together to address urgent humanitarian needs, in particular those related to people wounded in the conflict. They also pledged to facilitate, with United Nations assistance, the resumption of the normal functioning of all the country's major airports.

32. In an unannounced visit to Tripoli on 11 October, I addressed the second round of talks between both camps within the House of Representatives. The event marked the first time in which parliamentary members sitting in Tobruk had come to the capital in a formal capacity. Underlining the commitment of the United Nations and the international community to the democratic transition of Libya, I stressed that military means could not solve the country's political and institutional crisis, and that a viable solution should be sought through peaceful dialogue.

33. In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling on 6 November and the deepening political and institutional crisis resulting from it, my Special Representative proceeded to undertake new rounds of extensive consultations with all the different stakeholders in Libya, and with relevant regional and international actors, with the aim of encouraging a return to the negotiating table and consensus on a framework for moving the dialogue process forward.

34. A two-day UNSMIL-facilitated Libyan dialogue session, which commenced at the United Nations Office at Geneva on 14 January 2015, marked a major breakthrough and paved the way towards a series of talks held during January and February that encompassed several tracks. Among them was a political track focused primarily on reaching agreement on stabilizing the security situation in the country, appointing a national unity government and operationalizing confidence-building measures intended to create a more conducive environment for dialogue and to alleviate the suffering of the population. In particular, participants emphasized the need to address urgent human rights issues and humanitarian needs as well as to facilitate the movement of people and goods, including through the opening of airports.

35. In a positive development following the first round of talks in Geneva, the Libya Dawn and Sunrise military commands announced a unilateral ceasefire. Similarly, two days later, the Army Chief of General Staff issued a statement committing Operation Dignity forces to a ceasefire. It is expected that the announcements will form the basis for a more comprehensive and formal cessation of hostilities between the two sides in due course.

36. Representatives of municipal and local councils convened on 28 and 29 January, and additional tracks are envisioned to involve leaders of armed groups, representatives from the main political parties and social and tribal leaders.

37. In a significant gesture of goodwill announced at the conclusion of municipal and local council talks in Geneva on 29 January, representatives from Misrata and Tawergha agreed to establish a mechanism that would allow the Tawergha community improved access to Tawerghan detainees held by Misrata. The agreement also underscored the Tawerghan community's right of return to their hometown following their displacement during the armed conflict of 2011.

Constitution drafting process

38. Throughout the reporting period, the Constitution Drafting Assembly continued to push forward with its work relatively insulated from the country's ongoing political and military crises. The current political impasse has, however, placed the Assembly under considerable pressure to produce a draft text to put to a referendum quickly.

39. On 24 December 2014, the Constitution Drafting Assembly publicly released draft texts prepared by each of its eight substantive committees. The drafts appeared intended to serve as the basis for a new round of discussions with the Libyan public, which could then inform further development and revision of the text.

40. The timeline for the approval of a final draft constitutional text and the conduct of the constitutional referendum remains unclear. As yet there has been no formal discussion of a comprehensive draft.

41. Members of the Constitution Drafting Assembly appeared increasingly aware of the difficulty of their mandate and the limitations on their capacity. At the Assembly's request, UNSMIL and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) organized workshops on multilevel governance and financial systems in November. In response to requests for additional support, UNSMIL, UNDP and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) organized a workshop to bring together women civil society representatives, members of the House of Representatives and Constitution Drafting Assembly members. While other international partners have provided training programmes and assistance, UNSMIL continues to serve as the coordinating body and primary liaison for the international community to the Constitution Drafting Assembly.

III. Other activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

A. Electoral support

42. The precarious political and security situation during the reporting period prevented Libyan electoral actors from moving forward with preparations for the constitutional referendum in a meaningful way. As such, efforts shifted to strengthening Libyan legislation, policies, processes and institutional capacity to facilitate a rapid response should an election be called.

43. UNSMIL and UNDP continued to support the High National Election Commission and other electoral actors during the reporting period through technical assistance, professional development opportunities and facilitating dialogue between Libyan electoral stakeholders. UNSMIL and UNDP organized eight events on electoral topics during the reporting period. They also facilitated observation of the Tunisian presidential elections by 30 members of the Commission.

44. The increasingly polarized political environment has rendered it difficult for electoral actors in Libya to maintain their impartiality and operating capacity. In particular, the High National Election Commission has come under increasing pressure to demonstrate loyalty to the two opposing political camps led by the House of Representatives and the General National Congress. Members of the international community have continued to underscore and support the impartiality and independence of all electoral institutions.

B. Human rights, transitional justice and rule of law

45. The human rights environment in Libya deteriorated sharply during the reporting period. Fighting between armed groups resulted in violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and serious abuses of human rights, including the reported indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas, the abduction of civilians, unlawful killings, arbitrary executions, torture and other ill-treatment and the deliberate destruction of property. The lack of training and discipline among many of the fighters, coupled with the unreliability of their weapons, has contributed to the indiscriminate nature of the fighting.

46. During the Libya Dawn offensive into the Warshafana tribal belt area during September 2014, the warring sides were reported to have engaged in abductions, detentions and the torture of civilians, as well as indiscriminate shelling that damaged schools, hospitals and other facilities. Operation Libya Dawn also extensively targeted homes, farms and shops.

47. UNSMIL also received numerous reports of indiscriminate shelling by both sides during the fighting in Benghazi, as well as of the deliberate destruction of homes and other property by armed elements aligned with Operation Dignity.

48. The outbreak of violence in Tripoli and Benghazi resulted in the displacement on multiple occasions of many members of the Tawerghan community, who had already been displaced from their hometown during the conflict in 2011. By the end of December 2014, approximately 1,144 Tawerghan families were displaced from

five camps in Benghazi. Many are currently housed in schools, rented homes or other public facilities in Benghazi, Ajdabiya and other places.

49. The situation of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, which was already of serious concern before the outbreak of violence in July, deteriorated further during the reporting period as a result of the fighting. Many faced arbitrary detention and abusive detention conditions, particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa. The number of sea crossings towards Europe from Libya during 2014 has far exceeded those of any other year. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that, out of the 170,100 persons who arrived in Italy between January and December 2014, approximately 141,000 departed from Libya, while some 3,300 are known to have drowned at sea and an unknown number have gone missing. Of those who arrived in Italy between September and December, some 48,800 departed from Libya.

50. Attacks on women activists increased during the reporting period, with many having to flee Libya after threats against them or their children. One activist reported that she had received several telephone calls from armed groups warning that if she continued writing on women's rights, she and her children would be killed. She and her family have since left the country. Another who had taken part in a public debate on women's rights received anonymous telephone calls and text messages warning that she would be abducted and killed.

51. Freedom of expression and assembly came under intense attack during the reporting period. Deepening political polarization generated a climate of fear in which people have become increasingly reluctant to discuss violations and abuses. Media professionals and facilities have also been targeted, with several journalists abducted or killed, including Al-Tayeb Issa and Mutassim al-Warfali in October. Scores of human rights defenders have fled the country.

52. In mid-October, the National Council for Civil Liberties and Human Rights received a number of threats from individuals claiming to be affiliated with the Libya Dawn coalition. In late November, the Council's premises in Tripoli were forcibly shut down.

53. The reporting period witnessed a number of attacks targeting Egyptian Copts. On 23 December, a couple was killed at their home in Sirte, allegedly by Ansar al-Sharia elements. Their 13-year-old daughter was abducted and found dead the following day. On 29 December, seven others were reportedly abducted while en route to the Egyptian border. On 3 January 2015, armed militants abducted 16 Copts in Sirte. They were among the 21 people seen beheaded in a video clip released by ISIL on 15 February. The fate of seven other Egyptian Coptic Christians abducted by armed groups in separate incidents from the vicinities of Sirte and Misrata between August and September 2014 remains unknown.

54. Attacks against religious sites were also reported, with several in Tripoli reportedly vandalized by armed elements. They include the Othman Pasha madrasa and the Karamanli, Shaib al-'Ain, al-Manara al-Jafariya and Shari' Mizran mosques. A group reportedly attempted to attack the Darghouth mosque several times, but were repelled by men from the area.

Abductions, torture and killings

55. Fighting in Libya was accompanied by reports of systematic abductions, detentions, torture and executions by all sides to the conflict. In the west, armed groups, whether affiliated with the Libya Dawn coalition, Warshafana or Zintan, all committed abductions in the aftermath of the fighting in Tripoli as well as during the Warshafana conflict. Many remained in captivity until exchanged for other abductees. UNSMIL also received several reports of torture and deaths in custody associated with the Warshafana conflict. In the east, armed groups affiliated with Operation Dignity abducted dozens, some of whom were allegedly beaten with sticks, hoses and rifle-butts while in detention.

56. UNSMIL also documented several cases of deaths in custody and extrajudicial killings during the reporting period. Known activists Tawfik Bensaud, aged 18, and Sami al-Kawafi, aged 17, were among 10 people killed in Benghazi on 19 September 2014. In Derna, lawyer Osama al-Mansuri was killed on 6 October, in apparent retaliation for his criticism of a declaration by local armed groups in which they pledged allegiance to ISIL. In mid-November, a source claiming to be associated with the terrorist Ansar al-Sharia group posted an online video appearing to show the beheading of an Operation Dignity fighter, Ahmed Muftah al-Nazihi.

Judiciary and penal system

57. The continued fighting across many parts of the country placed further pressure on a judicial system already battered by a string of attacks targeting judges and prosecutors. Official courts remain non-operational in Benghazi, Derna and Sirte. In Derna, sharia courts have reportedly been established outside the scope of State authority.

58. In a context involving rising numbers of conflict-related detainees and detainees outside the control of the judicial police, reports of human rights violations in Libyan prisons increased during the reporting period. UNSMIL received reports of beatings, torture and other ill treatment in the Jawiya Institution for Correction and Rehabilitation in Misrata, as well as in the Abu Salim and Mitiga detention centres in Tripoli. In October 2014, UNSMIL visited the two facilities in Tripoli and the Hadhba detention centre located in the city, but was prevented from meeting with detainees in confidence. On 22 October, the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council reportedly moved more than 130 inmates from the Buhdeima military prison to an unknown location and declared that they would be tried under sharia law.

Trials of officials of the former regime

59. The trial of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, Abdullah al-Senussi and 35 other former regime officials before the Tripoli Court of Assize, which was suspended during the fighting in Tripoli, resumed in October 2014. Mr. Qadhafi remained in detention in Zintan, and had not participated in trial sessions via video link since their resumption. Eight defendants previously held in Misrata were moved to Tripoli in November.

60. The trial risks falling short of international standards in part because of the accelerated pace at which it is proceeding. The prosecution presented its case in less than one hour, without calling any witnesses. The court has asked defence lawyers

to present their case while apparently limiting them to two or three witnesses per defendant. Despite obtaining copies of case materials after some delays, the lawyers reported difficulties in meeting clients in private. Defence lawyers for both Mr. Al-Senussi and Mr. Qadhafi have changed several times.

61. In December, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court found that Libya had failed to surrender Mr. Qadhafi to the Court, and referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council. Both Mr. Qadhafi and Mr. Al-Senussi have been unable to access legal counsel representing them before the International Criminal Court.

C. Security sector

Border security

62. The conflict in Libya has left its security institutions with little or no capacity to secure the country's borders, giving rise to increased opportunities for the movement of extremist groups, transnational organized crime and illegal smuggling of migrants. Fighting between Libyan factions has also sparked several incidents at or close to border crossing points, most notably attacks on the Ras Jdair border area between Libya and Tunisia.

Arms and ammunition management

63. The United Nations Mine Action Service maintained a presence in Libya until the end of November 2014, but has since evacuated its international staff owing to deteriorating security conditions. UNSMIL and the Mine Action Service continued to convene monthly international coordination meetings throughout the reporting period in order to facilitate international efforts to support arms and ammunition management in Libya. UNSMIL and the Mine Action Service also supported humanitarian mine action by the Libyan Mine Action Centre, as it oversaw the removal and disposal of 20 tonnes of explosive remnants of war and unexploded ordnance from Tripoli and the surrounding area. The Mine Action Service also advised the Libyan Mine Action Centre on emergency risk education and the creation of a hotline for civilians, which received more than 700 calls in its first 20 days.

Defence sector reform

64. UNSMIL discontinued its defence sector reform support to the Ministry of Defence and the Libyan Armed Forces in the light of political and security developments, and has retasked staff and resources to support the political dialogue process. The Mission's defence sector reform staff are currently focused on engaging national security forces and armed groups to encourage their participation in the dialogue process, and in ongoing preparatory work on new security arrangements, including ceasefire implementation, monitoring mechanisms and the withdrawal of armed groups from towns and cities across Libya.

65. UNSMIL continues to convene regular international coordination meetings on Libyan defence sector reform in Tunis, and has maintained a good working relationship with Libyan counterparts in the national security forces and various armed groups.

Police reform

66. UNSMIL has similarly retasked its remaining police reform staff and resources to support the political dialogue process, largely focusing on engaging the Ministry of Interior, police and armed groups.

D. Coordination of international assistance

67. During the reporting period, UNSMIL continued to coordinate international assistance to Libya, including by chairing a number of international coordination groups in the areas of security, human rights, elections, the constitution and women's empowerment.

E. Humanitarian situation

68. Notwithstanding security considerations, the United Nations country team continued to provide humanitarian assistance wherever possible, working in close coordination with the Libyan Red Crescent Society, Libyan non-governmental organizations and other national partners, including the Libyan Crisis Committees. During the reporting period, the World Food Programme delivered more than 500 metric tons of food and the International Organization for Migration, along with UNHCR, provided non-food items to the internally displaced, migrants and refugees. The United Nations country team organized a number of capacity-development activities outside Libya focused on national data collection and analysis.

69. On 19 September 2014, the humanitarian country team launched the Libya Humanitarian Appeal, with its main focus on food, health and protection. Although some Member States initially expressed interest in providing funding, the response to date has fallen considerably short of the $35,250,000 requested. The lack of adequate funding is likely to have an adverse impact on the ability of United Nations funds, programmes and agencies to deliver on growing humanitarian demands, as well as on efforts under way towards the implementation of confidence-building measures. Separately, the decision by the Central Emergency Response Fund to allocate $4,861,508 constituted an important step towards addressing immediate humanitarian needs.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

70. As at January 2015, a total of 238 UNSMIL international and national staff members and Government-provided personnel were deployed. Of those, 80 national staff members remain in Tripoli, while among the international component 59 were relocated to Tunis, 45 to Zarzis and 36 to Brindisi. In addition, UNSMIL has three staff members at Headquarters and 15 at the Global Service Centre in Brindisi.

71. Pursuant to my request to the Secretariat to conduct a review of the United Nations presence in Libya, the Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat, in coordination with the inter-agency task force for Libya, conducted a strategic assessment aimed at providing the Security Council with recommendations for the realignment of the United Nations presence in the country for the next 12 to

24 months. As part of that process, a strategic assessment mission deployed to Tunis from 7 to 13 January 2015, and met with a range of Libyan actors as well as international partners, UNSMIL and Country Team leadership. On 13 February, I submitted a special report to the Security Council outlining the key findings and recommendations of the strategic assessment.

V. Safety and security

72. The overall security situation in Libya remains highly volatile and unpredictable, and there has been a sharp military escalation across different parts of the country. Major security challenges include consistent and serious security incidents involving acts of armed conflict and terrorism throughout the country.

73. A spate of security incidents targeting the international community during the reporting period prompted the closure of almost all embassies in Tripoli. Attacks and threats against the diplomatic community and different United Nations premises included the detonation of car bombs near the embassies of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates on 13 November 2014, followed by another attack on the Algerian embassy on 17 January 2015. The headquarters of the Libyan Diplomatic Police Department, responsible for protecting foreign missions, was targeted by a car bomb on 27 December. An attack by unidentified gunmen on members of the Diplomatic Police stationed outside the UNDP office in Tripoli on 23 January resulted in the death of one police officer.

74. A terrorist attack on the Corinthia hotel in Tripoli on 28 January left at least eight people dead, including five foreign citizens. Militants claiming allegiance to ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack, reportedly in retaliation for the death of Nazih al-Regaei, also known as Abu Anas al-Liby, who was abducted from Libya by commandos from the United States of America in October 2013 and died in United States custody on 2 January 2015. The hotel attack marks the first operation targeting a location known to be frequently used by foreign diplomats and companies, Government officials and United Nations staff.

75. On 9 November 2014, two car bombs detonated in al-Baida, near where my Special Representative was meeting with Prime Minister Al-Thinni. On 24 November, a group of approximately 150 demonstrators gathered outside the UNSMIL compound in Tripoli, demanding my Special Representative's departure from Libya. The demonstration quickly developed into a potentially threatening situation, but was eventually defused without serious incident. Later that day, forces associated with Operation Dignity launched an airstrike on Mitiga Airport in Tripoli, prompting the United Nations to evacuate all remaining international staff from Tripoli to Tunisia on 25 November.

VI. Financial aspects

76. Pending clarity on UNSMIL operations in Libya owing to the deteriorating political and security situation in the country, interim funding in the amount of $31,430,300, representing a technical rollover of 50 per cent of the level of the projected expenditures during 2014, was approved for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2015 by the General Assembly in its resolution 69/262. A detailed budget

proposal for 2015, incorporating fully any decisions taken by the Security Council, will be prepared for consideration by the Assembly during the second resumed part of the sixty-ninth session.

VII. Observations and recommendations

77. Four years since the start of the revolution on 17 February 2011, the country's faltering political process has brought Libya dangerously close to the brink of all-out civil war. The continued presence and consolidation of parallel executive and legislative bodies has contributed to the further weakening of the Libyan State and its social fabric.

78. Notwithstanding the grim realities that now confront the Libyan people in their daily lives, the start of the Libyan political dialogue process facilitated by my Special Representative is a reassuring sign that the country's leaders are showing commitment to finding a peaceful resolution to their country's political crisis and military conflict. In view of the heavy legacy bequeathed to the country following decades of authoritarian rule, the deep sense of mistrust among the parties and the myriad of challenges confronting the transition, it is likely that a meaningf..l and genuine dialogue process will be complex and fraught with difficulty.

79. Nonetheless, the country's leaders must be mindful that the alternative to political dialogue is protracted violence and political upheaval that will only serve to undermine their country's national unity and territorial integrity. I take this opportunity to remind them that the crisis in Libya is primarily political in nature, and that the solution can only be attained through dialogue and compromise.

80. The Libyan parties must also understand and accept that engaging in the dialogue process entails a commitment to uphold its outcomes and to return to the political process and the path of democratic transition. I therefore urge all parties and stakeholders in Libya to approach the dialogue process in good faith and in the spirit of compromise that will spare the Libyan people further bloodshed and strife. The Libyan people will accept nothing less.

81. The United Nations and its international partners remain committed to assist the democratic transition of Libya. I take this opportunity to express appreciation to Member States that have committed resources in support of the Libyan political dialogue and to call on all regional and international actors to lend their unequivocal support to the process under way. None can afford to see Libya descend into further chaos and violence; Libyan stability remains integral to that of its neighbours, and the wider region.

82. While underscoring the need for a political solution to the country's problems, it must be recognized that the objective cannot be attained without finding durable solutions to the long-standing issues regarding the proliferation of arms outside State control, and of armed groups that now wield considerable influence over the political process. Progress on those fronts will require major security sector reform that meets international standards, and the integration of combatants into the police and armed forces or reintegration into civilian life.

83. Against the backdrop of continued political and military upheaval, I am deeply alarmed by the growing influence of terrorist groups in Libya, particularly that of ISIL. As appalling as they may be, the terrorist attacks and other acts of savagery

witnessed in Tripoli and other parts of the country are only a forewarning of what those groups are capable of wreaking, and of the imminent danger they pose to Libyan society and people.

84. Political divisions and disagreements should not be allowed to distract from or undermine the collective responsibility which Libyan leaders from across the political and military spectrum share in addressing the growing threat of terrorism and of radical jihadist groups that have sworn allegiance to groups that have come to symbolize brutality and barbarity at their worst. The continued failure to stem the military conflict and bring an end to the political turmoil provides a breeding ground for those movements to flourish and consolidate their presence and operations. None of the parties in Libya should be under any illusion as to what those extremist groups ultimately strive for: the systematic destruction of all symbols of the modern State and its institutions, the abandonment of any notion of democratic transition or State-building and the creation of a political system that breeds violence and fear.

85. In that regard, I urge all stakeholders in Libya to exert every effort towards overcoming their political differences and disagreements and to find a way out of the political crisis that has engulfed the country over much of the past year. I also remind all parties that the fight against terrorism is a collective responsibility, and that it must be led by the State on the basis of a broad national consensus. For its part, the United Nations and the international community stand ready and committed to assist the Libyan State and people in combating groups that are intent on spreading a culture of chaos, violence and extremism across Libya and beyond.

86. The humanitarian situation resulting from the conflict in Libya and the increasing inability of the State to meet the basic needs of the population is adding further to the hardship being endured by the Libyan people. Of equal concern is the burgeoning crisis of governance at all levels of the State, evident also in the difficulties and challenges confronting municipal and local councils as they strive to meet the needs of their constituents, including those displaced by the conflict and who have sought refuge in host communities. I also take the present opportunity to reiterate earlier calls for Member States to redouble their efforts towards mobilizing additional resources in support of the Libya Humanitarian Appeal. That will be key to enabling the United Nations to urgently address the humanitarian needs of the Libyan people.

87. The dramatic escalation in fighting and related abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law during the reporting period is a cause for deep concern. The Libyan authorities must hold accountable, in accordance with international standards, all parties responsible for serious violations and abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law regardless of affiliation. Leaders should declare publicly that such violations will not be tolerated and that those committing them will be removed from active duty and held accountable. Detained persons should be treated humanely and released or handed over to the justice system. All hostages should be released immediately. Armed groups must also account for the fate of those detained and under their control who are presumed missing.

88. I am encouraged by the continued progress in the work of the Constitution Drafting Assembly despite the difficult political and security circumstances under which it is operating. In view of the key role that the Constitution will have as the linchpin of a modern democratic Libyan state, I call on all the parties in Libya not

to take any action that could jeopardize the constitution drafting process. While the United Nations and the international community will spare no effort in providing the necessary technical assistance, it is vital that the Constitution Drafting Assembly expedite its efforts to complete its work within clear timelines.

89. In February, I submitted to the Security Council a report on the future of the United Nations presence in Libya (S/2015/113). The report covers the main findings of a review led by the Secretariat and recommendations for the reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in Libya to adjust to the new realities on the ground. I identified five priorities for United Nations engagement in Libya: support to the political process, protection, support to key institutions, support for the provision of essential services and coordination. While I recommended against the full return of the United Nations to Libya, I noted the need for a limited but continuous footprint in the country of about 15 to 20 substantive staff from across the United Nations family. I trust my report was useful to the Security Council in crafting a new mandate for UNSMIL focused on the priorities listed above.

90. Finally, I wish to extend my sincere appreciation to the staff of UNSMIL and the United Nations system for their efforts to support the transition of Libya, and I commend my Special Representative, Bernardino León, for his strong leadership and tireless efforts to bring Libyan political leaders to the table.

United Nations A/69/798–S/2015/145

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
26 February 2015

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 42
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventieth year

Letter dated 25 February 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 24 February 2015, addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, the Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit **Çevik**
Permanent Representative

15-02948 (E) 030315

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 25 February 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 10 February 2015, addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the Security Council and of the General Assembly (A/69/771-S/2015/101), which yet again contains false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertion regarding the "illegally issued two notices to airmen", it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace, including issuance of notices to airmen, are carried out by the relevant authorities of the State in accordance with article 3 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation.

Similarly, the assertion raised in the said letter regarding Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. This constitutes yet another attempt aimed at distorting the facts and the realities on the island. As noted in our previous letters, such allegations are based on the false and unlawful claim that the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriot administration extends over the whole island, including the territory, national airspace and territorial waters of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This pretentious contention by the Greek Cypriot side ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent, self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As for the repeated false allegations regarding the Ercan airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre (ACC) and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control.

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and recommendations, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan airport as well as using the airspace of the Turkish Republic

of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased, in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan ACC is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara ACC in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2014 alone, the number of passengers who used Ercan airport stood at almost 3,250,000, while the projected number of passengers for 2015 is 3,500,000. Moreover, in 2014, around 25,000 planes used Ercan airport for arrival and departure, and around 200,000 planes used the Ercan advisory airspace. These numbers are expected to be around 27,000 and 210,000, respectively, for 2015. In this respect, it must be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944 and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

Continuous attempts by the Greek Cypriot side, through often repeated false statements, to confer legitimacy upon the long-defunct "Republic of Cyprus" are futile since the Turkish Cypriot people will never give in to their unjust demands. What would indeed contribute to a better atmosphere on the island is for the Greek Cypriot side to stop misappropriating for itself rights and responsibilities it does not legally have, and to cease its hostile acts against the Turkish Cypriot people. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey, and that its insistent denial of the Turkish Cypriot rights in the North of the island does not bode well for the prospects of finding a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to call on the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue its well-known propaganda tactics and return to the negotiating table without any preconditions, as also called for in the latest United Nations Security Council resolution on Cyprus (2197 (2015)), so that a fair and durable comprehensive settlement could be achieved through your good offices mission in Cyprus without further delay. As the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to maintaining our constructive and positive stance and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2015/146

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 March 2015
English
Original: French

Letter dated 26 February 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw the attention of the Security Council to the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, specifically, the discussions about the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

My Government asks the Security Council not to take action on the report of the Secretary-General and MONUSCO without first having heard the position of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Accordingly, my Government wishes to request that the next meeting of the Council on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO be an open meeting, to allow for the participation of the delegation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which will be led by His Excellency Mr. Raymond Tshibanda N'tungamulongo, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

My Government would be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ignace **Gata Mavita**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-03067 (E) 020315 020315

Please recycle

United Nations S/2015/147

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 February 2015

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

Reporting period from 6 November 2014 to 27 February 2015

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my last report of 5 November 2014 (S/2014/784).

2. A serious breach of the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel occurred on 28 January, when Hizbullah launched several anti-tank guided missiles from the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) towards an Israeli military convoy south of the Blue Line in the vicinity of the Shab'a Farms area. Two Israeli soldiers were killed and several other soldiers and civilians injured in the attack. During subsequent fire by the Israel Defense Forces into Lebanon, a peacekeeper from UNIFIL was also killed, and the Security Council condemned his death in the strongest terms. Rockets were then fired from the UNIFIL area of operations and further shelling by the Israel Defense Forces ensued before the firing ceased. Hizbullah claimed responsibility for the attack, which it said had been in retaliation for an alleged Israeli airstrike on 18 January on the Golan in the Syrian Arab Republic, which killed six Hizbullah members and a high-ranking Iranian military officer. The immediate engagement with the parties by my Special Coordinator and the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, including through UNIFIL liaison and coordination arrangements, prevented further escalation and helped restore the cessation of hostilities. I addressed the developments directly with both Prime Minister Tammam Salam and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, calling for a return to calm and for all concerned to act responsibly. My Special Coordinator was also in contact with regional partners for their support in this regard. In spite of this serious violation, Israel and Lebanon reaffirmed their commitment to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and to the stability of the Blue Line area.

3. During the reporting period, the Lebanese Armed Forces continued to work robustly to contain threats emanating from extremist armed groups along the border with the Syrian Arab Republic. There has been continued violence in and around the town of Arsal, including car bombs and attacks on the Lebanese Armed Forces.

15-03022 (E) 060315

Please recycle

Lebanese soldiers and security personnel continue to be held hostage near Arsal by the Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

4. There was a major terrorist attack targeting the Alawite community in Tripoli on 10 January, which caused a number of casualties. Cross-border shelling and shooting from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon continued, causing some injuries and material damage. There were also a number of airstrikes by Syrian government aircraft on Lebanese territory. The Lebanese Armed Forces reported continued smuggling of weapons across the Lebanese-Syrian border.

5. As a result of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, Syrians continue to seek shelter in Lebanon. As at 1 February, there were over 1,168,000 Syrian refugees registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, an increase of approximately 30,000 since my last report. However, there has been an overall decline in the number of refugees being registered as a result of new restrictions on entry into Lebanon. On 15 and 16 December, the Deputy Secretary-General visited Lebanon and jointly launched the Lebanon Response Crisis Plan for refugees and host communities with Prime Minister Salam.

6. The Cabinet of Prime Minister Salam has continued to govern within the constraints caused by the persistent vacuum in the presidency. There have been 19 sessions of Parliament to elect a new president, but owing to the lack of a quorum resulting from the absence of members of Parliament from the 8 March bloc, the parliamentary process has been blocked. Talks between representatives of the Free Patriotic Movement and the Lebanese Forces have not yet moved forward with respect to an agreement over a candidate. Following a vote by parliamentarians on 5 November to extend Parliament's mandate until 20 June 2017, the Constitutional Court upheld the legality of the vote in a decision on 30 November.

7. On 23 December, the Future Movement and Hizbullah initiated a dialogue under Speaker Nabih Berri's auspices aimed at measures, which, among other things, would lower tensions between the Sunni and Shia communities, and agreeing on a mechanism to elect a new president. Five sessions of the dialogue have now been held, which have led to agreement on steps to calm the situation on the ground, where necessary, and on the need for the authorities to conduct sensitive security operations. These include a raid on Roumieh prison and the implementation of a security plan for the northern Beqaa, which is now under way.

8. On 31 December, the Secretary-General extended the mandate of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon for a period of three years from 1 March 2015, in accordance with resolution 1757 (2005).

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

9. A UNIFIL investigation was launched immediately to determine the facts and circumstances of the 28 January incidents. At the time of writing, the preliminary investigation had been completed and an interim investigation report shared with the parties. Preliminary information indicates that Hizbullah launched six anti-tank

guided missiles from the vicinity of Maysat village in the UNIFIL area of operations (Sector East) towards an Israel Defense Forces convoy approximately five kilometres south of the Blue Line in the vicinity of the Shab'a Farms area. Two Israeli soldiers were killed and seven Israeli soldiers and four civilians were injured in the attack, which destroyed three vehicles. The Israel Defense Forces retaliated with artillery and mortar rounds, which impacted in the areas of Arab el Louaize, near Ghajar, El Majidiye and Kafr Shuba (Sector East). During the course of retaliatory fire a UNIFIL peacekeeper in position 4-28 was killed.

10. Following Israeli retaliation, five rockets were fired from the UNIFIL area of operations in the vicinity of Kafr Shuba, impacting south of the Blue Line. The Israel Defense Forces responded anew with tank fire and artillery in the direction of Kafr Shuba. During the entire period, the Israel Defense Forces fired a total of approximately 90 rounds of 155 mm artillery, 28 rounds of mortar and 5 tank rounds. The preliminary investigation by UNIFIL also showed that this retaliation included 20 white phosphorus mortar shells. UNIFIL personnel also reported mortar fire from the east of United Nations position 4-7C in the UNIFIL area of operations, but this could not be confirmed. There were no reports of further casualties. The escalation was contained and fire ceased on both sides shortly thereafter. This violence constituted violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of the cessation of hostilities. UNIFIL remained closely engaged with both the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces as events developed, urging both sides to exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid any further escalation of the situation and restore the cessation of hostilities.

11. In a statement on 28 January, Hizbullah claimed responsibility for the attack on the Israeli military convoy that it attributed to its "Quneitra martyrs group" in reference to the 18 January alleged Israeli airstrike against Hizbullah elements and a high-ranking Iranian military officer in the Golan. In a letter dated 28 January (S/2015/58), the Permanent Representative of Israel urged the Security Council to condemn Hizbullah, calling for it to be disarmed and for the Government of Lebanon to fully implement resolution 1701 (2006). In a letter dated 29 January (A/69/754-S/2015/69), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon stressed that his Government was committed to the provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) in their entirety and called on the Security Council to condemn Israel's "bombardment of Lebanon" as a flagrant violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

12. The incident of 28 January and Hizbullah's claim of responsibility demonstrated that unauthorized weapons are present in the UNIFIL area of operations in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The Lebanese Armed Forces has primary responsibility for ensuring at all times that the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River is free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL in accordance with resolution 1701 (2006). In accordance with its mandate, UNIFIL does not proactively search for weapons in the south. UNIFIL, in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, takes immediate action within all means and capabilities available in its mandate and to the full extent provided for in its rules of engagement, when specific information is received regarding the illegal presence of armed personnel or weapons inside its area of operations. Under its mandate, UNIFIL cannot enter or search private property unless there is credible evidence of a violation of resolution 1701 (2006), including an imminent threat of hostile activity from that location.

13. In addition, UNIFIL observed several instances of persons carrying unauthorized weapons in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). On 16 January, one man was carrying a pistol in Deir Mimess (Sector West). On 20 January, UNIFIL observed two men, each carrying an AK-47 assault rifle, in Tyre (Sector West). On the same day, in Sarda (Sector East), two men were spotted with two AK-47 rifles, while apparently providing security for a convoy of vehicles. In all cases, UNIFIL alerted the Lebanese Armed Forces.

14. Presumed hunting weapons also were seen by UNIFIL, but a decrease in the number of civilians carrying hunting weapons south of the Litani River was noted since the last report. In order to curb this activity, the Lebanese Armed Forces issued a public statement on 25 November reminding the local population of the ban against carrying hunting weapons south of the Litani River. UNIFIL patrols continued to inform the Lebanese Armed Forces when hunters were observed.

15. Since my last report, Israel violated Lebanese airspace almost daily, mostly with unmanned aerial vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). UNIFIL protested the violations to the Israel Defense Forces and called upon the Government of Israel to stop the overflights immediately. The Government of Lebanon also protested these violations of Lebanese sovereignty. However, the Government of Israel continued to claim that the overflights were necessary for the security of the country.

16. Israel also continued to occupy northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. UNIFIL received no response from Israel to its proposal, submitted to both parties in 2011, concerning security arrangements aimed at facilitating the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the area. The Lebanese Armed Forces conveyed in July 2011 its approval of the proposal.

17. Most ground violations of the Blue Line were perpetrated by farmers or shepherds for short periods of time in the vicinity of Shab'a, Kafr Shuba, Bastara, Blida, El Majidiye (Sector East) and Rumaysh (Sector West). In some cases, the shepherds, along with their flocks, stayed south of the Blue Line for several hours.

18. In a few cases, violations of the Blue Line were perpetrated by young men, at times armed, in civilian attire or indistinguishable military uniforms, climbing on top of Blue Line barrels. UNIFIL expressed concern to the Lebanese authorities at such activities, which also involved moving close to the Blue Line and monitoring the southern side of the Blue Line with Global Positioning System (GPS) devices, binoculars and professional cameras.

19. UNIFIL generally enjoyed full freedom of movement throughout its area of operations. There were two serious incidents during the period in which UNIFIL patrols were assaulted by men with unauthorized weapons. On 30 December, in Ramyah (Sector West), a UNIFIL patrol was assaulted by a group of approximately 15 civilians bearing pistols and a twin-barrel gun, after they had been observed violating the Blue Line by climbing on a Blue Line barrel. The group removed some UNIFIL equipment. UNIFIL vehicles arriving to provide reinforcement to the patrol were blocked about 100 metres away by another group of around 20 civilians, armed with pistols, knives and sticks. One man who was trying forcefully to enter a UNIFIL vehicle threatened a peacekeeper by holding a knife to his throat, while

others threatened the patrol with pistols. UNIFIL fired a warning shot, upon which the mob dispersed from the scene. To date, the equipment has not been returned.

20. On 23 January in Marwahin (Sector West), two armed men in civilian vehicles overtook and blocked a UNIFIL military police vehicle and used their pistols to repeatedly hit the vehicle, demanding a camera that they alleged the UNIFIL personnel had used. More vehicles, carrying approximately 15 men, most of them armed, arrived at the scene. As the UNIFIL military police officer attempted to call UNIFIL headquarters, the group snatched his cell phone, ransacked the vehicle, cut the radio wire and stole a number of items, including a radar speed gun, a camera and a cell phone. UNIFIL protested these incidents to the Lebanese authorities and requested that all incidents be investigated and their perpetrators held accountable.

21. In addition, UNIFIL patrols encountered four instances of aggressive behaviour. On 21 November, a group of seven youths threw stones at the vehicles of a UNIFIL patrol at Majda Zun (Sector West). On 8 December, the leader of a UNIFIL patrol was approached in Hallusiyat Al Fawqa (Sector West) by a group of civilians who took away his GPS device. The device was later returned to UNIFIL. On 28 December near Ayta ash-Shab (Sector West), a GPS device was snatched from a UNIFIL patrol by two men passing on an unregistered motorbike. On 20 January, a military laptop used for navigational purposes was stolen from a UNIFIL patrol during a confrontation with a group of civilians near Yatar (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces intervened and escorted the UNIFIL patrol out of the village.

22. The Force's freedom of movement was obstructed on two additional occasions. On 28 November, a UNIFIL foot patrol was denied access along a road close to Majda Zun (Sector West) by three civilians in a vehicle with a satellite phone. On 29 December, a UNIFIL vehicle patrol was denied access along a road close to Ash Sh'aytiyah (Sector West) by a group of civilians in cars and on scooters.

23. The aforementioned incidents notwithstanding, the relations of the Force with the local population remained largely positive. The Mission, in coordination with, among others, international and Lebanese non-governmental organizations, undertook regular outreach and liaison activities, including medical and dental assistance to the population, as well as road safety programmes for schoolchildren and veterinary services. UNIFIL continued to implement and monitor quick-impact projects in support of its mandate, including projects undertaken by troop-contributing countries.

24. On 30 December, an Israel Defense Forces tank pointed its main gun at and tracked a foot patrol from Observer Group Lebanon along the banks of the Wazzani River. On 14 January in Houla (Sector East), three Israel Defense Forces soldiers threw stones at two Lebanese civilians, who were taking pictures southward of the Blue Line.

25. The Lebanese Armed Forces protested an incident that reportedly occurred on 18 January in Ayta ash-Shab (Sector West), in which one Israel Defense Forces soldier allegedly activated smoke or tear gas grenades near the technical fence. The Lebanese Armed Forces said that the smoke had drifted towards Lebanese personnel positioned north of the Blue Line and caused respiratory problems among the

soldiers. UNIFIL did not observe the incident, but conducted an investigation that was inconclusive.

26. The strength of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River remained at approximately two brigades. The Lebanese Armed Forces continued their reinforcement in the vicinity of Shab'a village and the Arkoub area (Sector East).

27. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces continued to carry out their daily coordinated activities between the Blue Line and the Litani River. UNIFIL conducted on average 11,600 activities (patrols, checkpoints and observation tasks) monthly, including operations carried out in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces.

28. As at 1 January, UNIFIL had carried out 348 joint or coordinated exercises with the Lebanese Armed Forces, including 160 training activities and 12 sea exercises conducted by the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force with the Lebanese Navy.

29. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to carry out its dual mandate of conducting maritime interdiction operations and training the Lebanese Armed Forces. Since the last report, the Maritime Task Force hailed 1,285 ships, and the Lebanese Navy and Customs officials inspected 278 vessels to verify that there were no unauthorized arms or related materiel on board.

30. There were several incidents at sea that had the potential to raise tensions between the parties. On 20 January, UNIFIL observed an Israel Defense Forces patrol boat inside Lebanese territorial waters, 1,500 metres north of the line of buoys. The maritime border between Israel and Lebanon is disputed and UNIFIL has no mandate to monitor the line of buoys, which was installed unilaterally by the Government of Israel and is not recognized by the Government of Lebanon. On 13 January, two divers from a Lebanese Armed Forces patrol boat briefly entered the water from the north near the line of buoys. Subsequently, Israel Defense Forces divers visited the same general area, south of the line of buoys. The Israel Defense Forces protested this activity to UNIFIL, which in turn informed the Lebanese Armed Forces. On several occasions, Israel Defense Forces patrol boats pointed searchlights or launched flares at fishing boats in Lebanese waters. On 8 December, several Israel Defense Forces patrol boats fired automatic weapons when a Lebanese fishing boat was present 1,000 metres north of the line of buoys.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

31. UNIFIL continued to make extensive use of its liaison and coordination arrangements with the parties, including during times of crisis. Following the exchange of fire on 28 January between Hizbullah and the Israel Defense Forces, UNIFIL, through those arrangements and its deployment on the ground, helped to defuse the situation. The liaison and coordination arrangements constitute the basis for safeguarding the cessation of hostilities, ensuring full respect for the Blue Line and promoting security and stability in southern Lebanon in the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). The parties continued to engage constructively with UNIFIL at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, as well as in tripartite and bilateral settings. There was no progress towards establishing a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv.

32. The foremost mechanism for addressing all security and military operational issues related to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) remained the tripartite forum, chaired by the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, with the participation of representatives of the Israel Defense Forces and Lebanese Armed Forces.

33. Since my last report, tripartite meetings took place on 17 December and 4 February. During tripartite discussions, both parties acknowledged the importance of keeping the Blue Line stable in the context of broader regional security concerns and the possibility for localized incidents to spread rapidly. The first meeting was focused on Israeli allegations of Hizbullah activities near the Blue Line, ground violations of the Blue Line, particularly in the disputed Shab'a Farms area, and Israeli air violations. Discussions at the second meeting centred on the developments surrounding the 28 January incident and ways to strengthen the cessation of hostilities to avoid future such incidents.

34. UNIFIL completed its investigations into the 5 October shooting incident at the Blue Line and the 7 October incident, in which an Israel Defense Forces vehicle was hit by an improvised explosive device south of the Blue Line, and shared its findings with both parties.

35. UNIFIL continued the process of visibly marking the Blue Line. As at 9 February, out of a total of 527 markers assessed for the entire length of the Blue Line, 313 were agreed by both parties. Of the 313 agreed points, UNIFIL has cleared access lanes to 312 points from mines and unexploded ordnance, measured 241 points, constructed 229 points and verified 208 points.

36. UNIFIL continued to facilitate the capacity-building of the Lebanese Armed Forces for tasks mandated under resolution 1701 (2006) in the area of operations, through its strategic dialogue mechanism with the Lebanese Armed Forces. The strategic dialogue plan is an integral part of the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces and complements the efforts of the International Support Group to bolster the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

C. Disarming armed groups

37. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups outside the control of the Lebanese State, in violation of resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006) continues to restrict the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory. In the 28 January incident, these arms were used in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and in breach of the cessation of hostilities. During the reporting period, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah reiterated publicly that Hizbullah had substantial and sophisticated military capacity separate from that of the Lebanese State, which it claims serves as a deterrent against potential aggression from Israel. There were no meetings of the National Dialogue during the reporting period and no other formal discussion of arms outside the control of the State.

38. The security situation continued to be unstable in the eastern Beqaa, in and around the town of Arsal. A soldier was killed and two were wounded by a car bomb on 3 December. Another car bomb exploded, injuring a number of civilians on

8 December. The Lebanese Armed Forces successfully defused four other car bombs in Arsal during the reporting period.

39. Elsewhere, arms outside the control of the State continued to proliferate and undermine stability. For example, on 21 December, the Jaafar clan clashed with residents of Deir al Ahmar in the eastern Beqaa region. On 10 January, a personal dispute ended with a fatal shooting attack in Kfardebian. On 19 January, a soldier was wounded pursuing criminals in Baalbek. As a result of the proliferation of small arms there have been frequent incidents of "celebratory" gunfire associated with political speeches and events, which caused injury. There continue to be reports of political parties supporting the formation and arming of self-defence groups in local communities living in border areas.

40. Within Lebanon, there was a reduction in the number of terrorist attacks during the reporting period as a result of the efforts of the Lebanese Armed Forces and security personnel to prevent such attacks. In Tripoli, the Lebanese Armed Forces continued to implement the security plan, leading to relative calm, which was broken on 10 January by a double-suicide bombing, reflecting the continued impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon. That attack, claimed by the Nusra Front, targeted the Alawite community of Jabal Mohsen and killed 9 people and injured 37 others. Efforts by local leaders contributed to the lowering of tensions and prevention of retaliatory violence on neighbouring communities. Following the attack, the Internal Security Forces successfully conducted an unprecedented operation on 12 January to disrupt a terrorist communication network in Roumieh prison.

41. There has been no progress on the dismantling of military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada. In 2006, it was decided in the National Dialogue that the bases should be dismantled. The existence of the bases continues to compromise Lebanese sovereignty and impede the ability of the State to monitor and control effectively parts of the Lebanese-Syrian border.

42. The Palestinian camps have been relatively quiet during the reporting period. On 24 November, a Syrian refugee woman was killed during a clash between armed gangs in the camp of Burj el Barajneh. The Joint Security Force, which has taken responsibility for security in Ein el-Helweh, has expanded and intervened on a number of occasions to keep calm in the camp. On 28 January, a Palestinian was killed in Ein el-Helweh, and the Joint Security Force deployed quickly to prevent further violence. During a visit to Lebanon on 20 January, a senior Palestinian official asserted the need to disassociate the Palestinian camps from regional developments and to maintain stability and security in them.

D. Arms embargo and border control

43. In its resolution 1701 (2006), the Security Council decided that all States should prevent the sale or the supply of arms and related materiel to entities or individuals in Lebanon, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft. The Council also called upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points so as to prevent the entry into Lebanon, without its consent, of arms and related materiel.

44. Representatives of the Government of Israel have consistently alleged that there are significant, ongoing arms transfers to Hizbullah across the Lebanese-Syrian border. The United Nations takes these concerns seriously, but is not currently in a position to verify them independently. Representatives of the Government of Israel have continued to express concern at the prospect of the transfer of advanced weapons systems to Hizbullah. In a letter dated 12 December (S/2014/878), Israel communicated to the Security Council concerns at reports of Hizbullah's military capability and supply. Hizbullah leaders have openly stated their readiness to use their military capabilities against Israel in the event of attack by Israel, including with reference to the reported Israeli airstrike against Hizbullah elements in the Golan on 18 January. I expressed concern about the potential consequences of that incident as a reflection of the impact of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon, and called on all concerned to act responsibly to prevent any escalation, in full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries in the region and adherence to relevant Security Council resolutions.

45. The Lebanese Armed Forces deployed in border areas to counter the movement of armed elements between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic and successfully repulsed infiltration attempts by armed fighters. On 1 December, six Lebanese soldiers were killed and one was wounded in a clash with militants near Ras Baalbek. A further clash on 23 January in the same location left eight soldiers dead and a number wounded.

46. The Lebanese Armed Forces and security services have detained a number of Syrians during the reporting period, including members of ISIL, the Nusra Front and the Free Syrian Army. On 6 December, the detention was confirmed of two women related to ISIL figures who are believed to be holding some of the abducted Lebanese soldiers and security personnel. There has been no progress in efforts to negotiate the release of the 26 hostages held by the Nusra Front and by ISIL, and the killing of a fourth hostage was announced on 5 December.

47. During the reporting period, there was an overall decline in the number of incidents of cross-border fire from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon. There were over 40 incidents of shooting, 7 incidents of cross-border shelling and 16 rockets, causing a number of injuries and material damage. There were at least four airstrikes by Syrian government aircraft.

48. Hizbullah continued to publicly acknowledge its continued involvement in the fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic. The funerals of Hizbullah fighters continued to be held during the reporting period. Other Lebanese individuals are reported to have joined groups fighting the Syrian regime, including the Nusra Front and ISIL.

49. Infiltration attempts and attacks on Lebanese Armed Forces positions in areas by the border with the Syrian Arab Republic illustrate the need for greater capability for the Lebanese Armed Forces to defend Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The agreement for $3 billion of assistance provided by Saudi Arabia in cooperation with France was finalized during the reporting period. The disbursement of the additional $1 billion pledged by Saudi Arabia in August 2014 is reportedly on track to deliver urgently needed capability to the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces in the course of this year. Other bilateral partners continue to provide vital, immediate capability to support the Lebanese Armed Forces.

50. As at 12 February, over 1,168,000 Syrian refugees were registered with UNHCR in Lebanon in 1,170 communities across the country, including 54,846 in the UNIFIL area of operations. The Government of Lebanon has initiated a series of measures to restrict the flow of refugees into Lebanon. On 31 December, the General Security Directorate of the Ministry of Interior issued a new set of regulations whereby refugees would not be admitted to Lebanon except for exceptional humanitarian reasons based on criteria that are to be developed by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Security procedures and curfews imposed on refugees increased across the country, and there has been an increase in the number of evictions of Syrian refugees from their dwellings, mostly carried out by the Lebanese Armed Forces owing to their proximity to military bases. Harsh winter conditions have caused a number of fatalities from hypothermia among refugees.

51. The predicament of women and children refugees has worsened as a result of their prolonged displacement, making them vulnerable to early marriage, prostitution and sex in exchange for assistance, instances of which reportedly are on the rise. Only 24 per cent of the 402,000 Syrian children of primary school age in Lebanon are now enrolled in formal education.

52. On 15 December, the Government of Lebanon and international partners launched the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for the period 2015-2016. This joint plan aims to ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for refugees and vulnerable host communities, while maintaining and developing the capacity of national and local delivery systems to provide equal access to and ensure the quality of basic public services.

53. There are approximately 44,000 Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic in Lebanon. Their number has been stable since the restrictions imposed on their entry by the Government of Lebanon in May 2014. The restrictions continue to result in the denial of entry to all but a handful of Palestine refugees fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic and those refugees have faced increasing restrictions on renewing their legal status in Lebanon since May 2014.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

54. Six manual mine clearance teams, one explosive ordnance disposal team and one mechanical mine clearance team from UNIFIL, validated by the United Nations Mine Action Service, were deployed in the UNIFIL area of operations during the reporting period. UNIFIL cleared more than 216 square metres of hazardous areas to provide access to Blue Line points and found and destroyed two anti-personnel landmines. The team conducted 3 training support events, 20 quality assurance visits of operational sites and 7 explosive ordnance awareness training programmes.

55. The Lebanese Mine Action Centre reported that, from 1 September to 31 December 2014, it had cleared 543,603 square metres of hazardous areas, mainly battle areas, and destroyed 629 cluster munition items, one anti-personnel mine and 41 unexploded ordnances.

F. Delineation of borders

56. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian border during the reporting period, including in areas where it is uncertain or disputed, as called for in Security Council resolutions 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006). Extending the authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout all Lebanese territory and enabling the Lebanese security forces and Lebanese Armed Forces to secure borders to prevent the entry of arms or related materiel necessitates the delineation and demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic as soon as practicable.

57. There has also been no progress on the issue of the Shab'a Farms. There has still been no reaction from either Israel or the Syrian Arab Republic to the provisional definition of that area contained in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/641).

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

58. UNIFIL continuously reviewed its security plans and risk mitigation measures and carried out three security awareness exercises for its personnel during the reporting period. Force protection works to upgrade installations and assets are ongoing. Cooperation continued between UNIFIL and the Lebanese authorities in ensuring that all security threats are addressed appropriately. More stringent security measures were introduced on 15 December within a selected area of Sector East of the UNIFIL area of operations, whereby all official missions of the United Nations must be coordinated and escorted by UNIFIL security personnel. In addition, in the aftermath of recent incidents, UNIFIL reviewed its security procedures, plans and actions. On 28 January, a general restriction of movement in the UNIFIL area of operations was implemented for that day for UNIFIL and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.

59. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings at the Lebanese Military Court against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers. In the case of a serious attack in 2007 against peacekeepers serving with the Spanish contingent, one of the suspected perpetrators was arrested and is currently under investigation. In the case of a serious attack perpetrated in 2008, the next hearing at the Military Court of Appeal is scheduled to take place on 17 March 2015. In three cases of serious attacks perpetrated in 2011, the investigation is ongoing. In a case of terror intent opened in January 2014, a hearing at the Permanent Military Court is scheduled to take place on 10 July 2015.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

60. As at 9 February, the total military strength of UNIFIL stood at 10,171, including 366 women from 37 troop-contributing countries. The civilian component consisted of 278 international and 607 national staff, including 82 and 156 women, respectively. A total of 59 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, including 3 women, are also part of UNIFIL. UNIFIL is

working to increase the number of civilian and military women deployed, with a view to reducing the gender imbalance in the mission.

61. There are 57 operational positions in the area of operations. On 18 December, Belgium withdrew its multi-role engineering company, which consisted of approximately 100 personnel. On 10 February, 146 Fijian troops, who were formerly part of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, joined UNIFIL, at United Nations position 2-45.

V. Observations

62. I condemn the attack on an Israeli military convoy on 28 January, claimed by Hizbullah, which killed two Israeli soldiers and injured several others. This attack constitutes a serious violation of the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel, and of the provisions of resolution 1701 (2006). Hizbullah's hostile activity from the UNIFIL area of operations is in direct contravention of resolution 1701 (2006), including the provision that there should be no armed personnel, assets or weapons in the area other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL.

63. Retaliatory fire by Israel into Lebanon is in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of the cessation of hostilities, and does not conform to the United Nations expectations that the parties will notify UNIFIL of an incident and will refrain from responding, except where clearly required in immediate self-defence. I condemn the killing of a United Nations peacekeeper, which resulted from retaliatory fire by the Israel Defense Forces into Lebanon. This incident took place within a United Nations position, the coordinates of which are fully known to the Israel Defense Forces.

64. Violence will not bring peace to the people of Lebanon or Israel. I wish to recall the letter dated 12 August 2006 from the Secretary-General to the Prime Ministers of Israel and Lebanon, which set out the expectations of the United Nations of how all concerned would fulfil their obligations with respect to the cessation of hostilities, including the appendix to the letters, in which it is stated that the cessation of hostilities would be understood as no firing into the territory of or at the other side with any type of weapon from the ground, air or sea.

65. I also wish to recall that the identification of the Blue Line in 2000 was solely the responsibility of the United Nations for the practical purpose of confirming the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Lebanon in compliance with resolution 425 (1978), without prejudice to future border agreements. Both sides, despite their respective reservations in 2000, undertook to respect the Blue Line as identified by the United Nations. I again urge both parties to do their utmost to prevent violations of the Blue Line. The Blue Line must be respected in its entirety.

66. I welcome the restoration of the cessation of hostilities following the incident. I take note that both the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel acted quickly to prevent further escalation and to emphasize their commitment to resolution 1701 (2006) and to preserving the stability in the area. Yet the situation remains fragile. This fragility is compounded by the use of increasingly strident and bellicose rhetoric, warning of renewed conflict. The lessons learned from the 2006 conflict should serve as a cautionary reminder of the even more dangerous scale of

any renewed confrontation. All concerned therefore have a responsibility to avoid rhetoric that raises tensions and contravenes the spirit of resolution 1701 (2006).

67. In the current tense regional environment, and in the light of the multiple security challenges Lebanon faces as a result of the conflict in Syria, I am particularly concerned at the risk of miscalculation leading to a new conflict that neither of the parties nor the region can afford. It is imperative that all concerned refrain from any further action that could jeopardize the cessation of hostilities or destabilize the area and work to restore fully the calm across the Blue Line. I welcome the satisfaction expressed by both parties with the critical security and liaison role of UNIFIL in implementing resolution 1701 (2006), including to defuse any escalation from the recent incidents. I call on both parties to continue to use the established liaison and coordination arrangements to the full extent and work closely with UNIFIL in order to mitigate the risk of further violence. I further urge the parties to engage actively with my Special Coordinator for Lebanon and UNIFIL on measures to regain confidence.

68. The recent incidents are a strong reminder of the responsibility of both parties to fulfil their respective obligations and to make progress towards the full implementation of the objectives of resolution 1701 (2006). The incident underlines the necessity, for the safety of both the Lebanese and the Israeli people, for the parties to take advantage of periods of calm across the Blue Line to strengthen the cessation of hostilities by working towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict, as envisaged in resolution 1701 (2006). This includes the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory so that it may exercise its full sovereignty and the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon so that there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State. In line with resolution 1701 (2006), I urge the Lebanese authorities to take all actions to ensure that there are no unauthorized armed personnel, assets or weapons in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River.

69. The violence on 28 January also underscores the need for progress with regard to the Shab'a Farms area in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 (2006). I call, once again, on the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel to submit their responses to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area that I provided in October 2007 (S/2007/641). I continue to encourage the parties to work with my Special Coordinator and UNIFIL to achieve these aims, including through progress on the Shab'a Farms area issue.

70. The continuing occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces represents an ongoing violation of resolution 1701 (2006). Israel has an obligation to withdraw its armed forces from the area, in accordance with the resolution, and I urge the Israeli authorities to take steps to that end accordingly.

71. It is also a matter of serious concern that Israel continues to violate Lebanese airspace on an almost daily basis. All Israeli overflights of Lebanon are violations of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. At a time of heightened regional tensions, when the potential for escalation remains high, I call on both parties to maintain calm and stability along the Blue Line. I reiterate my call upon the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory and Lebanese territorial waters.

72. I urge both parties to continue to work with UNIFIL to maintain calm, minimize and halt violations, look for practical localized solutions and build on what has been achieved by strengthening the liaison and coordination arrangements, including through the tripartite mechanism. The visible marking of the Blue Line continues to be an essential confidence-building activity that has helped to calm tensions in some areas. I encourage the parties to continue to work with UNIFIL in the ongoing process to mark the Blue Line in its entirety and to find practical localized solutions for problematic areas.

73. I am concerned that incidents that impede the freedom of movement of UNIFIL and endanger the safety and security of peacekeepers continue to occur. Some of the incidents can be explained by the inconvenience caused by the presence of a large military force operating within a civilian environment. Nevertheless, I am concerned that several of these incidents have included violent assault on UNIFIL personnel and some have shown an organized character. This casts doubt on the motives of those involved. The primary responsibility for ensuring freedom of movement to UNIFIL personnel in the area of operations lies with the Lebanese authorities. I call on the Lebanese authorities to take firm, resolute action against the perpetrators and to find ways to work with UNIFIL to strengthen the response and investigation into the incidents. Effective measures must be taken to curb and prevent all incidents that impede the freedom of movement of UNIFIL and endanger the safety and security of peacekeepers.

74. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups outside the control of the State continues to pose a threat to Lebanese sovereignty and stability, and contradicts the country's obligations under resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). The unforeseen consequences of the use of these arms are extremely serious for Lebanon should they provoke conflict. It is vital that the National Dialogue meet again to address issues of national importance, including the arms held by Hizbullah and other groups. The discussion paper on a national defence strategy developed in the context of the National Dialogue remains a valuable starting point in this regard. It remains important that earlier decisions of the National Dialogue be implemented, specifically those relating to the disarmament of the non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the military bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

75. The spread of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic along the Lebanese-Syrian border has had a deeply negative impact on the broader security situation. People living along the eastern Beqaa have been particularly affected. I strongly support the efforts of the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed there to maintain security and defend Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and encourage ongoing bilateral efforts to strengthen that deployment along the length of Lebanon's borders. I further call on those holding Lebanese security forces personnel hostage to release them expeditiously. I deplore the shelling, shooting and aerial incursions into Lebanese border areas from the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the movement of armed fighters and war materiel between the countries. The lack of progress in delineating and demarcating the border between the two countries is no justification for violations of Lebanese sovereignty by any party. I call upon the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and all parties fighting there to cease violations of the border and to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

76. I condemn the participation of Lebanese citizens in the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic in breach of the policy of disassociation adopted by the Government of Lebanon and of the principles of the Baabda Declaration, which had been agreed by all of Lebanon's political parties in June 2012 and the importance of which was reaffirmed by the Security Council. I call on all Lebanese parties to cease any involvement in the Syrian conflict, consistent with their commitment in the Baabda Declaration and urge them to recommit to the policy of disassociation.

77. I condemn the terrorist attack in the Jabal Mohsen neighbourhood of Tripoli and sectarian rhetoric by all parties, which encourages such violence. I commend the people of the areas neighbouring Jabal Mohsen who rejected the attempt to restart further rounds of sectarian fighting in that area. That suicide attack and violence elsewhere around the country reflect the worrying proliferation of weapons outside the authority of the State, and in this regard I call on Member States to uphold their obligation under resolution 1701 (2006) to prevent the sale or supply of arms or related materiel to entities or individuals in Lebanon.

78. Continued broad political support is needed for the security and judicial authorities to combat impunity in respect of all acts of violence. The extension of the mandate of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which coincides with the tenth anniversary of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, is a reaffirmation of the commitment of the United Nations to the work of the Special Tribunal with the continued support and cooperation of the Government of Lebanon. The trial of the five individuals suspected of the attack that killed Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 21 other people is ongoing. That trial sends the message that impunity will not be tolerated.

79. I commend the Lebanese Armed Forces for their continued commitment and strong cooperation with UNIFIL, including through the strategic dialogue. The Lebanese Armed Forces and security services continue to play a critical role in preserving Lebanon's stability in the light of the multiple security challenges that the country continues to face in fulfilling its obligations under resolution 1701 (2006); enforcing security on the Lebanese-Syrian border; fighting criminality; and combating terrorism within the country. I regret the loss of life that the security personnel have sustained as they have undertaken these duties. I welcome the support of bilateral partners for the Lebanese Armed Forces and security services, both in terms of immediate assistance and the longer-term development of the Lebanese Armed Forces. In this regard, I welcome the finalization of the agreement for $3 billion of assistance from Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with France, and encourage progress in the delivery of this much-needed capability in view of the scale and scope of the challenges facing the Lebanese Armed Forces. I call on other international donors to provide assistance as a key element towards the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and other relevant Security Council resolutions.

80. I welcome the consensus that the Security Council has consistently demonstrated in support of Lebanon's security and stability and count on the Council's continued unity as key to preserving Lebanon from the impact of conflicts in the region and helping it to address current challenges. I also thank the participants in the International Support Group for Lebanon for their continued commitment to the three primary areas of support to Lebanon and their activities in this regard. I believe that the Group plays an important role in advocating for

assistance and mobilizing support for Lebanon at this difficult time for the country and I will ask my Special Coordinator to consult with partners on how the Group might best achieve these goals going forward, in the light of Lebanon's outstanding needs and challenges.

81. The launch of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan by Prime Minister Salam and the Deputy Secretary-General marks the first joint plan of the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon since the start of the war in the Syrian Arab Republic and serves to align United Nations and national priorities for Lebanon's stability. Lebanon received 54 per cent of the appeal for its needs in 2014. In the light of the unique scale and nature of the refugee crisis in Lebanon and its implications for the country's stability, I call on donors to respond generously, as a matter of urgency, to the appeal for $2.14 billion required under the Plan for 2015, including at the Kuwait donor conference to be held on 30 March.

82. I welcome the renewed commitment of the Palestinian leadership to disassociate the Palestinian camps in Lebanon from the violence in the region. I welcome Palestinian efforts on the ground to work with the Lebanese authorities to maintain order in Ein el-Helweh and elsewhere. The need to improve the living conditions of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, without prejudice to the resolution of the refugee question in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement, is ever more urgent, as the Palestine refugee camps are increasingly overcrowded as a result of the growing numbers of Palestine refugees displaced from the Syrian Arab Republic. I encourage donors to be forthcoming in support of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, including to enable it to effectively assist displaced Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic.

83. For both Lebanon and Israel, exploration and development of their respective offshore oil and gas resources is a national priority. During the reporting period, both countries indicated their wish to resolve the dispute over the maritime exclusive economic zone. I again encourage them to proceed with steps that would allow for resolution of this issue and reiterate that the United Nations stands ready to assist if both parties so request.

84. I strongly commend Prime Minister Salam for his leadership in working with the political leaders and Government of Lebanon to uphold national unity and ensure the continuity of State institutions. It is positive that the Future Movement and Hizbullah are engaged in dialogue and that tangible results are felt in the country in security terms and in lowering tensions. Nine months after the departure of former President Sleiman, I am increasingly concerned about the prolonged crisis around the presidential vacancy. The issue of ending the presidential vacuum remains vital for Lebanon's national unity and stability and for the country's standing regionally and internationally. It is therefore in the national interest that all parties show greater resolve and flexibility to elect a president and uphold the institutions enshrined in the Taef agreement.

85. Recent developments have again shown that the impact of events in the Syrian Arab Republic can seriously threaten stability in Lebanon. The perpetuation of the war in the Syrian Arab Republic, including the Golan, continues to harm Lebanon's security, political stability and economy. It therefore remains essential to find a political solution to end conflicts in the region and progress towards a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East on the basis of Security Council

resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). This and the full integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon remain interdependent.

86. I wish to express my appreciation to all the Member States contributing military personnel to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon. I commend the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander and the military and civilian personnel of UNIFIL, as well as my new Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the staff of her Office, all of whom continue to play a critical role in helping to promote stability along the Blue Line and in Lebanon.

United Nations S/2015/148

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 February 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 4 February 2015 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to write to you with regard to document S/2015/10, dated 2 January 2015, containing the summary statement by the Secretary-General of matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration. I have the honour to inform you that Sweden requests that the following item, listed in paragraph 3 of the above-mentioned document, remain on the list of matters of which the Council is seized:

74. Briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Per **Thöresson**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

15-03042 (E) 020315

Please recycle

United Nations A/ES-10/675–S/2015/149

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
2 March 2015

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 27 February 2015 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

In follow-up to my recent letter regarding the vile terror attacks being committed by Israeli settlers against Palestinian civilians and properties, I regret to inform you of another attack, committed yesterday on a Christian holy site. Such vicious attacks, directly aimed at insulting and intimidating Palestinian Muslims and Christians, are inflaming religious sensitivities and tensions and risk instigating the outbreak of a religious war, with all of the grave ramifications in this regard.

Yesterday, 26 February, extremist Israeli settlers set fire to a Christian seminary belonging to the Greek Orthodox Church in the Old City of Occupied East Jerusalem. Extensive damage was caused by this blatant act of terrorism, including the burning of a schoolroom in the seminary and the spray-painting of hate graffiti about Jesus on the seminary's walls consisting of vulgar and offensive words that cannot be printed in such diplomatic correspondence. This crime comes on the heels of the attack, committed a day earlier, on a mosque in the village of Jaba'a in the Bethlehem area, where Israeli settlers also burned the mosque and defiled its walls with graffiti.

Such attacks have been repeatedly perpetrated by gangs of racist, extremist and terrorist Israeli settlers who have been deliberately transferred to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, by Israel, the occupying Power, in grave breach of international law. As such, Israel bears ultimate responsibility for the presence of the settlers on our land and for all of their crimes, including all acts of terror.

It is clear that attacks against Palestinian Christian and Muslim holy sites are intended to terrorize and intimidate the Palestinian people, an objective shamelessly claimed by settlers carrying out this violent campaign, which they have dubbed as "price tag" attacks for years, as well as by settler leaders, some of them members of the Israeli Government. Such attacks are perpetrated daily in the form of assaults on

Please recycle

Palestinian school children, in brutal attacks against Palestinian farmers and shepherds, in vehicular attacks by settlers running over Palestinian civilians and countless acts of property destruction and vandalism. In addition to the recent attacks on the mosque and the church, another attack yesterday involved the vandalism of a school in the Palestinian village of Urif, near Nablus, where terrorists associated with the so-called "hilltop youth" settler group spray-painted "Death to the Arabs" on the walls of the school.

It must be reiterated that all such criminal actions are the responsibility of the occupying Power and are part of its illegal, destructive settlement campaign in the Occupied State of Palestine, including East Jerusalem. In this regard, as indicated in our recent letters and in various United Nations reports, Israeli settlement activities continue unabated, escalating with every passing year. As reported by the Israeli organization Peace Now, the year 2014 witnessed a 40 per cent increase in Israeli settlement activities, a 10-year high, and thousands of units are under construction and tens of thousands more are planned, further fragmenting our State's contiguity and territorial integrity.

Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable for all of these illegal policies and practices, by which it has expropriated and colonized Palestinian land, forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians and stolen unquantifiable amounts of natural resources from Palestine. Moreover, this colonization campaign must be immediately stopped before it renders meaningless and physically impossible the two-State solution. The international community, including the Security Council, must no longer tolerate the contempt of the Israeli Government for the global, unanimous demands to cease all settlement activities in the Palestinian territory it has occupied militarily since June 1967.

We thus reiterate our call on the Security Council to unequivocally reiterate its demand to Israel, the occupying Power, to cease all settlement activities throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in accordance with international law and the relevant Security Council resolutions. This is a sine quo non for ending the occupation and for salvaging the two-State solution and must be a central pillar of any genuine push for a just and peaceful solution. The Security Council bears a clear responsibility for promoting such a peaceful solution in accordance with its duty under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council must heed the appeals of the international community to overcome its paralysis vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to act with intent to contribute to the achievement of a solution.

In the case of continued Israeli violations, condemnation and appeals for cessation will no longer suffice and the Security Council must undertake specific measures to compel compliance by the occupying Power. Moreover, in this regard, we stress the legitimacy of all peaceful means of ensuring respect of international law, including accountability and redress through the International Criminal Court, to which the State of Palestine will soon become the 123rd State party.

The chances for peace are contingent on halting the Israeli settlement campaign, which is at the core of this illegitimate military occupation of Palestine and the prolonged conflict. A failure to rectify this situation will only foster greater Israeli impunity, bringing even more insecurity, including rising terror by settlers

emboldened by the lack of accountability, further entrenching the occupation and a fait accompli on the ground and cementing an end to the two-State solution.

This letter is in follow-up to our 538 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the State of Palestine. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 25 February 2015 (A/ES-10/674-S/2015/139) constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed against the Palestinian people, by Israel, the occupying Power, for which it must be held accountable and the perpetrators be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine
to the United Nations